

ANSWERS KEY WITH EXPLANATIONS

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Passage 1:

Question 1 Answer: C

Explanation: The passage begins by humanizing the victims of the crash and then pivots to demand an impartial inquiry and systemic aviation reforms. The author emphasizes transparency and structural change over mere financial redress. Option A is incorrect because, although compensation is mentioned, it is explicitly deemed insufficient alone. Option B is incorrect as pilot shortages are noted only tangentially, not as the main focus. Option D is incorrect since the author does not call for a Boeing ban but for collaborative investigation with Boeing and regulators. The core message is accountability plus reform, making C the precise summary. This aligns with the concluding call for meaningful tribute through investigation and sectoral improvements.

Question 2 Answer: A

Explanation: “Wherewithal” refers to the practical means or resources required to accomplish something. In context, the DGCA lacks the budget, personnel, or technical capacity to regulate effectively. Option B is incorrect because “wherewithal” does not imply stakeholder consensus. Option C is incorrect as “wherewithal” does not denote any ritual or procedure. Option D is incorrect since statutory authority differs from actual resources or capacity. Thus, only option A captures the sense of necessary means or resources.

Question 3 Answer: B

Explanation: “Scorched” metaphorically means burned or branded indelibly—akin to being “charred.” The passage conveys that the crash video will sear into collective memory.

Option B (“soaked”) is wrong because it implies saturation, not burning. Option C (“frozen”) is the opposite of burned and conveys cold immobility. Option D (“enveloped”) merely means covered, lacking the connotation of irreversible marking. Only “charred” carries the sense of intense, permanent burning.

Question 4 Answer: C

Explanation: The DGCA’s function is to regulate airlines; Capa India’s role, as described, is to warn about pilot shortages. Option A (“innovate”) is incorrect—no innovation role is mentioned. Option B (“advise”) is too broad; the passage specifies a warning. Option D (“investigate”) does not reflect Capa India’s activity in the text. Hence, “warn” is the precise parallel: DGCA regulates :: Capa India warns

Question 5 Answer: B

Explanation: The author states, “Compensation, while necessary, is not a substitute for accountability,” expressing skepticism that payouts alone suffice. This acknowledges compensation’s importance but insists on concurrent investigations. Option A is incorrect as the author rejects compensation as sufficient by itself. Option C is wrong because the author is not indifferent to compensation’s role—they call for both compensation and accountability. Option D is too extreme—the author does not delay compensation but demands it alongside an inquiry.

Thus, the author is skeptical that compensation can replace systemic reform

Question 6 Answer: A

Explanation: Option A adds the verb “are,” completing a single, coherent sentence: “A doctor couple and their three young children are en route ...” Option B misplaces commas and lacks a clear main verb. Option C leaves a subordinate clause without a main clause to anchor it.

Option D splits the thought into two fragments, disrupting flow and cohesion. Only A restores grammatical completeness and maintains the original succinctness.

Passage Overview & Reading Approach

This passage mourns the human tragedy of an Air India crash while urging a rigorous, transparent inquiry and systemic reforms in India’s aviation sector. It moves from vivid, emotional narratives of the victims to technical and regulatory critique—highlighting Boeing’s safety flags, DGCA’s resource gaps, and marketplace pressure deficits. Test takers should read actively, first noting the shift from pathos (human stories) to logos (data and reform calls). Recognize the author’s stance: accountability over mere compensation. Given its mixed narrative and argumentative tone, expect moderate-to-high difficulty in distinguishing emotional appeals from the core logical thrust.

Question-Specific Approaches

1. Main Idea (Q1):

Approach: Identify the author’s thesis by tracking where the passage’s focus culminates—toward investigation and reform. Contrast initial emotional framing with the concluding policy recommendations.

2. Vocabulary (Q2):

Approach: Contextualize “wherewithal” within the sentence—what does the DGCA lack? Look for clues about capacity (resources vs. legal power vs. consensus) to pinpoint the correct nuance.

3. Synonym (Q3):

Approach: Note the metaphorical “scorched into memory.” Which word best evokes that lasting, burning imprint? Eliminate options that imply wetness, freezing, or mere covering.

4. Analogy (Q4):

Approach: Map each term’s function: DGCA’s action = regulate, so find Capa India’s analogous action in the text (“warned that pilot shortages...”).

5. Author’s Stance (Q5):

Approach: Focus on qualifying language around compensation (“necessary, not a substitute”). Determine whether the tone is supportive, skeptical, indifferent, or rejectionary.

6. Grammar (Q6):

Approach: Transform the fragment by supplying a clear subject–verb–complement structure. Spot the missing verb that restores grammatical integrity.

Elaborate Logical Brief

Element	Details
Premises	<p>-A London-bound Air India flight crashed, killing over 240 people.- Boeing 787 Dreamliner has past technical issues (“engine shutdowns,” “hydraulic leaks”).</p> <p>-DGCA lacks sufficient resources (“wherewithal”) to regulate effectively.- Pilot shortages are worsening.</p>
Arguments	<p>-Accountability > Compensation: Compensation is “necessary” but cannot replace a thorough investigation (“not a substitute”).</p> <p>-Regulatory Reform: DGCA needs more power and resources (e.g., fine-imposition authority).</p> <p>-Market Pressure Insufficiency: Dominant airlines face little incentive to elevate safety.</p>

Element	Details
Inferences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Victims’ stories personalize the stakes, implying emotional weight should translate to political will for reform. -Boeing’s whistleblower issues suggest potential manufacturing shortcuts affecting safety.
Conclusions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Urgent, impartial inquiry involving DGCA, Boeing, and international regulators. -Structural reforms in DGCA’s capabilities and airline safety oversight. - Industry-wide engineering audits.
Assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An independent investigation will yield actionable safety insights. -DGCA, if properly resourced, can enforce meaningful standards. - Airlines’ safety culture responds to regulatory pressure.
Paradoxes	<p>Compensation vs. Accountability Paradox: While financial redress soothes victims’ families, it may undercut the drive for systemic safety improvements if seen as a “get-out-of-reform-free” card.</p> <p>Dominant Market Paradox: Market leaders can underinvest in safety precisely because their market share makes them less vulnerable to competition.</p>

Passage 2:

Question 7 Answer: B

Explanation: The passage recounts recent racist violence in Northern Ireland—riots targeting migrants—then critiques the way some unionist leaders mixed legitimate service-strain grievances with language that inflamed hate. The author’s chief aim is to expose both the immediate brutality of these attacks and the political rhetoric that underpins them. Option A is incorrect because, although the passage contrasts diversity with past conflict, it does not celebrate that diversity; rather, it highlights the violence against newcomers. Option C is wrong since policy recommendations or integration strategies are not offered; the focus is on events and culpability. Option D is mistaken because, while sectarian distrust and deprivation are mentioned, the central thread is the Muslim-mob violence and the language that fuels it. Thus B—not A, C, or D—best captures the dual narrative of violence description and political condemnation.

Question 8 Answer: A

Explanation: “Leavening” literally refers to adding yeast to dough, lightening its texture. Metaphorically, here it signifies that some measure of opprobrium (harsh criticism) was lightened—or diluted—by invoking “legitimate” grievances. Option B (“Intensification”) is incorrect because it implies making the criticism stronger, whereas the author says the opprobrium was softened by the grievance talk. Option C (“Masking”) is wrong; the passage does not suggest a superficial cover-up but a genuine mixing that reduced the bite of condemnation. Option D (“Transformation into a rigid state”) misreads the metaphor entirely. Only A conveys the sense of diluting severity by blending in something lighter or more palatable.

Question 9 Answer: B

Explanation: A “conflagration” is a large, destructive fire. Metaphorically, the author uses it to describe how isolated acts of bigotry can spread into a widespread, burning turmoil—much like a wildfire. Option A (“Embers”) are the small, dying remnants of a fire and do not connote a raging blaze. Option C (“Embellishment”) is unrelated to fire and means decorative exaggeration. Option D (“Consecution”) is not a standard word and certainly not a fire metaphor. Only “wildfire” correctly mirrors the idea of rapid, uncontrollable spread.

Question 10 Answer: A

Explanation: The passage explicitly states Northern Ireland has about 3.4% immigrants, England & Wales 18.3%, and Scotland 12.9%. Option B incorrectly swaps the England & Wales and Scotland figures—12.9% belongs to Scotland, not England & Wales. Option C misattributes 12.9% to Northern Ireland and 3.4% to England & Wales, reversing the actual statistics. Option D places the highest figure (18.3%) in Northern Ireland, which directly contradicts the text. Only choice A faithfully reflects the passage’s data.

Question 11 Answer: B

Explanation: The author likens the Ballymena riots’ escalation from “a single spark” to “a conflagration of violent bigotry” to last summer’s UK riots sparked by a tragic murder. This demonstrates that isolated incidents can rapidly trigger mass xenophobic violence when socio-economic grievances and extremist networks are present. Option A is wrong because the passage does not portray grievances leading to peaceful protests; it shows them leading to violence. Option C is incorrect: the passage criticizes, not praises, political leaders’ handling of grievances—some politicians “cross” the line and stoke further violence. Option D is mistaken since the author explicitly draws a direct parallel between sectarian (Northern Ireland) and racial (elsewhere) violence, showing they share dynamics. Hence, B captures the analogous logic.

Question 12 Answer: B

Explanation: The author condemns those politicians who, in referencing “legitimate” grievances, cross into rhetoric that “makes violence more likely.” This language reflects moral outrage at leaders who exploit public discontent to stoke xenophobia—describing them as “routinely” shaming themselves by fueling disorder. Option A is incorrect because the author does not portray them as principled, but rather as culpable. Option C is wrong; there’s no suggestion of naiveté—these politicians knowingly use inflammatory narratives. Option D misreads the passage: politicians here are not framed as necessary provocateurs for reform but as destructive instigators of violence. Only B correctly identifies them as opportunists using hateful rhetoric for political ends.

Passage Overview & Reading Approach

This passage examines recent anti-migrant riots in Northern Ireland—rooted in both immediate triggers and deeper socio-political grievances—and critiques the political rhetoric that softens condemnation by invoking “legitimate” service-strain complaints. It contrasts Northern Ireland’s historically low diversity with rapid demographic shifts in towns like Ballymena, then situates these events within a broader UK pattern of xenophobic violence. Test takers should track the shift from factual reportage (who, what, where) to analytical commentary (why, with what implications), noting the author’s critical stance. Expect moderate difficulty in distinguishing descriptive detail from evaluative argument and in mapping cause-and-effect relationships.

Question-by-Question Approaches

7. Main Idea

- **Approach:** Scan the passage’s opening and closing sentences: first the depiction of violence, then the censure of political complicity. Identify which answer best captures both descriptive and critical elements.

8. Vocabulary

- **Approach:** Locate “leavening” in context—what effect does it have on “opprobrium”? Determine whether it lightens, intensifies, covers up, or hardens the criticism.

9. Synonym

- **Approach:** Note the metaphor “spark...conflagration.” Which choice invokes a rapidly spreading, destructive fire? Eliminate options unrelated to fire imagery.

10. Factual

- **Approach:** Find the sentence giving immigrant percentages (“3.4%...18.3%...12.9%”) and match precisely—beware of swapped figures.

11. Similar Logic (Analogy)

- **Approach:** Compare the Ballymena riot narrative with last summer's UK riots: identify the shared dynamic (single incident → widescale xenophobic violence).

- 12. Author's Stance • Approach:** Focus on the final line about politicians who "routinely cross" the line: is the tone approving, condemning as opportunism, forgiving, or neutral?

Elaborate Logical Brief

Element	Content
Premises	1. Northern Ireland's immigrant share is low (3.4%) but rising sharply in towns like Ballymena. 2. A vigil for two arrested Romanian boys devolved into racist mob violence. 3. Police faced violent resistance (bricks, petrol bombs). 4. Similar riots occurred elsewhere in the UK after unrelated triggers. 5. Political leaders mixed condemnation with references to "legitimate" service-strain grievances.
Arguments	A. Descriptive–Critical Link: Vivid incident reporting establishes emotional weight, then political commentary links rhetoric to violence. B. Rhetorical Culpability: Politicians who couch hate in "legitimate" complaints dilute opprobrium and thereby fuel disorder. C. Comparative Insight: The pattern of single sparks igniting mass xenophobia is a UK-wide phenomenon, not unique to Northern Ireland.
Inferences	1. Political rhetoric that "leavens" criticism makes violence more likely. 2. Extremist infrastructures (far-right, paramilitary ties) enable rapid escalation. 3. Socioeconomic grievances can be valid yet exploited as pretexts for bigotry.
Conclusions	– Immediate and unequivocal political condemnation must avoid layering in "grievance" rhetoric. – Recognize and dismantle extremist networks tied to paramilitaries. – Address underlying deprivation without enabling violent scapegoating.
Assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politicians' words materially influence mob behavior. • Acknowledgment of genuine service-strain issues can be separated from hate-fueling narratives. • Comparative incidents across the UK share sufficiently similar dynamics to inform each other.

Element	Content
Paradoxes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimate Grievance vs. Illegitimate Violence: While service-strain critiques may be factually accurate, their deployment in political speech paradoxically legitimizes violence they ostensibly aim to explain. • Low Diversity vs. Rapid Change: A history of low immigrant numbers breeds both a belief in social homogeneity and acute fear when demographic shifts occur, paradoxically intensifying xenophobia.

Passage 3:

Question 13 Answer: C

Explanation: The passage surveys competing concepts of political freedom—negative versus positive—and illustrates how freedom must be claimed, not passively received. It highlights recent British legislative changes and French revolutionary imagery to underscore the contestation of freedom. Option A is incorrect: while free will debates are mentioned, the focus is political freedom specifically. Option B is wrong because Delacroix’s painting is a springboard for discussing manipulation and revolt, not art history per se. Option D is too narrow: the repeal of a university free-speech duty is an example, not the central thrust. Only C captures both theoretical definitions and practical power struggles.

Question 14 Answer: B

Explanation: “Scratch the surface” idiomatically means to address a topic only superficially, without delving into deeper details or complexities. The author flags that the discussion will be introductory. Option A is wrong—it’s the opposite of comprehensive analysis. Option C misreads the metaphor as destructive (“damage”) rather than cursory inspection. Option D (“polish or refine”) also misinterprets it, suggesting improvement rather than superficiality. Hence, B precisely conveys the intended meaning of a shallow or preliminary treatment.

Question 15 Answer: B

Explanation: By definition, negative freedom is freedom **from** interference; positive freedom is freedom **to** act—to pursue goals or exercise capabilities. Option A merely restates negative freedom, not its positive counterpart. Option C conflates political power with freedom, missing the individual agency emphasis. Option D misattributes positive freedom as absence of responsibility, whereas the passage (via Sartre) underscores responsibility as intrinsic to freedom. Only B correctly parallels the concept of “freedom to” do something meaningful.

Question 16 Answer: C

Explanation: The author asserts that “if you want freedoms, you’ll have to demand them” because those in power “would rather have a quiet life.” This implies active civic engagement is necessary. Option A is incorrect: it says governments grant rights willingly, directly contradicting the text. Option B is wrong because, far from easy, the author warns that lost rights are “very frightening and hard to reverse.” Option D builds an unwarranted absolutist prescription about university speech duties; the author mentions their repeal but does not claim they should never be repealed. Thus, C best reflects the author’s view on political change.

Question 17 Answer: A

Explanation: Describing revolutionaries as if they have “strings” being cut is a metaphor: people likened to puppets controlled by unseen forces. Option B (“hyperbole”) is incorrect—there is no exaggeration about art’s power to influence politics; it’s a conceptual device. Option C (“synecdoche”) misidentifies the part/whole relationship; “strings” do not stand for the movement itself, but for external control. Option D (“irony”) is not supported: the passage doesn’t suggest that revolutionaries both control and are controlled in an ironic twist, but simply employs a metaphor of liberation from manipulation. Therefore, A is correct.

Question 18 Answer: B

Explanation: The author highlights Sartre’s view: “we are all inescapably free” and bear the “burden of responsibility” that comes with freedom. This endorsement frames existential freedom as both universal and weighty. Option A is wrong—Sartre’s abstraction is presented as relevant, not irrelevant. Option C incorrectly reads existentialism as undermining legal struggles, whereas the passage situates Sartre alongside other freedom discourse. Option D wrongly confines Sartre’s doctrine to academia; the author uses it to enrich the political discussion. Only B accurately captures the author’s portrayal of Sartre’s radical freedom.

Passage Overview & Reading Approach

This passage interrogates the contested nature of political freedom, contrasting negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to) definitions with real-world power struggles—from tightened UK protest laws to France’s revolutionary symbolism. It underscores that freedoms must be actively demanded and are perilously easy to lose. Test takers should first map theoretical distinctions (negative vs. positive freedom), then track concrete examples (UK legislation, Delacroix’s painting, Sartre’s existentialism) and the author’s critical stance on political manipulation. Given its blend of conceptual definitions and illustrative anecdotes, the passage poses moderate difficulty in distinguishing abstract arguments from empirical details.

Question-by-Question Approaches

13. Main Idea

- Focus on the author's opening contrast of freedom concepts and the closing critique of power dynamics. Eliminate options that overemphasize history or art history.

14. Vocabulary

- Locate "scratch the surface" and interpret its idiomatic meaning ("superficial examination"), then choose the option that best mirrors that nuance.

15. Analogy

- Recall negative freedom = freedom *from* constraints; search for the parallel definition of positive freedom as freedom *to* act or pursue goals.

16. Inference

- Identify the sentence about demanding freedoms ("you'll have to demand them"). Infer which choice aligns with the claim that political change requires citizen agitation.

17. Figure of Speech

- Examine the "strings" metaphor: who is "manipulated" and what is implied. Recognize puppet imagery and select the corresponding rhetorical device.

18. Author's Stance

- Review the Sartre reference: freedom + "burden of responsibility." Determine which option accurately reflects the author's presentation of existential freedom.

Elaborate Logical Brief

Element	Details
Premises	1. Free will debates hinge on definitions of free will; likewise, political freedom requires conceptual clarity (negative vs. positive). 2. UK protest laws were tightened, and a university free-speech duty was repealed without debate. 3. Historical French symbols (Delacroix's 1830 painting; Statue of Liberty) and Sartre's existentialism illustrate freedom's political and philosophical dimensions.
Arguments	A. Conceptual–Practical Link: Theoretical definitions of freedom must be tested against political realities where powerholders resist granting rights. B. Active

Element	Details
	<p>Demand: Freedoms are not gifts but hard-won through public agitation; absence of trouble for rulers means absence of rights for citizens. C. Symbolic Resonance: French revolutionary imagery underscores freedom's enduring political mystique and the perpetual struggle to sever control ("cut their strings").</p>
Inferences	<p>– Passive acquiescence yields no new liberties; only active contestation can secure or restore freedoms.– Repeal of free-speech duties without debate signals political expediency overriding principled commitment to rights.– Existential freedom (Sartre) frames responsibility as inseparable from liberty, implying moral accountability for one's actions regardless of external constraints.</p>
Conclusions	<p>– Citizens must vocally and publicly demand freedoms; rights will not be granted quietly.– Legislators should justify any curbs on speech and protest through open debate rather than unilateral repeal.– True freedom encompasses both absence of interference (negative) and capacity for self-determination (positive), demanding vigilance and personal responsibility.</p>
Assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political power naturally inclines toward preserving control over granting rights. • Conceptual clarity (negative vs. positive freedom) aids in diagnosing real-world policy conflicts. • Symbolic and philosophical narratives (art, existentialism) meaningfully inform contemporary debates on freedom.
Paradoxes	<p>1. Freedom's Gift Paradox: Leaders often proclaim freedom as fundamental yet resist codifying or protecting it, revealing a tension between rhetorical celebration and political reality.2. Burden-Liberation Paradox: Sartre's radical freedom liberates individuals intellectually but imposes an "inescapable burden of responsibility," showing that autonomy and obligation are two sides of the same coin.</p>

Passage 4:

Question 19 Answer: B

Explanation: The passage vividly catalogues entrenched bribery, paid news, black-money politics, and institutional decay, then repeatedly questions the fairness and strength of Indian democracy. This sustained exposé of systemic corruption and its corrosive impact on governance underpins the author's central aim.

- Option A is incorrect because the author's personal media frustrations serve only as framing for a broader critique, not as the main focus.
- Option C is wrong; the tone throughout is critical, not celebratory, emphasizing "shocking" consequences rather than an "economic boom."
- Option D is incorrect; there's no comparative analysis with other nations—only a deep dive into India's internal failures. Thus, B precisely captures the passage's purpose.

Question 20 Answer: B

Explanation: Here, "latitude" metaphorically denotes the freedom or leeway the author lacked in reporting—i.e., scope for editorial choice.

- Option A is wrong: while "latitude" can mean geographic, the context is about professional freedom, not the equator.
- Option C misreads the term as precision, whereas latitude implies flexibility, the opposite of exactness.
- Option D is incorrect because latitude does not relate to temperament or calmness. Only B aligns with the intended meaning of discretionary freedom.

Question 21 Answer: C

Explanation: "Robust" implies strength and resilience. Its antonym is "frail," meaning weak or feeble.

- Option A ("Resilient") is actually a synonym of "robust."
- Option B ("Vigorous") likewise connotes energy and strength.
- Option D ("Sturdy") again aligns with robustness, not its opposite. Thus, C is the only true antonym among the options.

Question 22 Answer: D

Explanation: By shifting to passive voice—"Coverage...is available" rather than "Authorities sell coverage"—the author removes specific actors and highlights the systemic, impersonal nature of corruption as an institutionalized practice.

- Option A is incorrect; passive voice does not highlight individuals but rather omits them.

- Option B is wrong because moral outrage arises from content, not whether the clause is active or passive.
- Option C misattributes ambiguity as the goal; the real effect is depersonalization, not confusion.
- Only D correctly identifies that passive construction underscores an ingrained, impersonal system where corruption operates autonomously of named agents.

Question 23 Answer: B

Explanation: The alarming statistics on child malnutrition, lack of sanitation, and water scarcity demonstrate that neglect and corruption within institutions translate directly into life-threatening conditions for the population.

- Option A is incorrect: the data point to undernutrition and inadequate infrastructure, not overeducation or unemployment challenges.
- Option C is wrong because these figures illustrate worsening public-health crises, not solutions from urbanization.
- Option D is incorrect; the author emphasizes domestic institutional failure, not international aid.

Hence, B is the only inference supported by the evidence.

Question 24 Answer: D

Explanation: The author explicitly states that for most Indians “their country is not much of a republic and even less of a democracy,” detailing how corruption, paid news, and political manipulation have subverted democratic norms. This view demands vigilant scrutiny and active reform rather than passive acceptance.

- Option A is incorrect: the author portrays the system as deeply flawed, not merely inefficient.
- Option B, while close, understates the call for active vigilance and reform implied by the exposé; the framing “dangerously subverted” goes further.
- Option C is wrong: there is no praise or idealization of India’s system.
- Only D captures both the depth of subversion and the necessity for public vigilance and reform implicit in the author’s critique.

Passage Overview & Reading Approach

This passage probes India’s deep-seated systemic corruption—bribery, paid news, black-money politics—and examines its devastating social consequences and implications for democracy. The author blends personal journalistic frustration with hard statistics to argue that India’s institutions have been compromised, leaving citizens deprived of basic rights. Test takers should first chart the passage’s structure: an introduction of the author’s motive, a catalog of corrupt practices, the social fallout (pollution, malnutrition, lack of sanitation),

and a closing indictment of democratic subversion. Expect high difficulty in distinguishing rhetorical framing from factual data and in mapping the severe social inferences the statistics support.

Question-by-Question Approaches

19. Main Idea

- Identify the sustained critique of corruption and its threat to democratic health; eliminate choices focused on personal anecdotes, celebration, or international comparison.

20. Vocabulary

- Focus on “latitude” in context of journalistic freedom; rule out geographic or emotional meanings to isolate “scope for action.”

21. Antonym

- Interpret “robust” as strong; choose the only option that signifies weakness.

22. Style & Tone

- Analyze the passive construction (“is available”) to see how it abstracts agency; look for an answer that highlights systemic depersonalization.

23. Inference

- Link the cited social statistics to the author’s argument on institutional neglect and corruption; reject options that invert or ignore that causal relationship.

24. Author’s Stance

- Note the author’s unequivocal judgment that India is “not much of a republic” and “even less of a democracy,” then select the answer capturing both severity and the implied need for active reform.

Elaborate Logical Brief

Element	Details
Premises	1. Journalistic constraints previously limited the author’s reporting on corruption.2. Bribery, paid news, black-money politics, and institutional collusion are pervasive (“everything and everyone ... is on sale”).3. 42% of children are underweight; 60% lack bathrooms; 330 million lack safe water; pollution and violence are rampant.

Element	Details
Arguments	<p>A. Systemic Corruption → Institutional Failure: Widespread bribery greases governmental machinery, undermining democratic processes. B. Social Consequences: Neglect and corruption inflict tangible harm—malnourished children, unsanitary living, polluted cities. C. Democratic Subversion: When political actors manipulate public processes for private gain, the republic devolves into oligarchy.</p>
Inferences	<p>– Citizens’ basic rights (clean water, nutrition, sanitation) are directly compromised by corrupt institutions.– Active public inquiry and institutional reform are necessary to restore democratic integrity.– Personal journalistic freedom is a microcosm of wider civic freedoms curtailed by power.</p>
Conclusions	<p>– India’s democracy is fundamentally weakened and demands vigilant public scrutiny.– Institutional rot must be addressed through transparency, accountability, and civic engagement.– Mere economic growth is insufficient if corruption deprives citizens of basic needs.</p>
Assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption directly causes social deprivation; causal link between bribery and lack of services is valid. • Statistical data cited are representative and reliable indicators of systemic failure. • Democratic integrity cannot be restored without active citizen demand and investigative journalism.
Paradoxes	<p>1. Freedom–Corruption Paradox: Journalistic “latitude” is constrained by the very corruption the author seeks to expose, illustrating how power shields itself by limiting scrutiny. 2. Growth–Deprivation Paradox: India’s booming economy coexists with the world’s highest child malnutrition rates, highlighting a stark divergence between macroeconomic success and micro-level human well-being.</p>

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

Passage 5:

25. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The name "Operation Sindoor" was a symbolic tribute, specifically chosen to honour the widows of the Pahalgam terror attack. *Sindoor* is traditionally worn by married Hindu women, and its invocation here served as a subtle yet poignant gesture acknowledging personal loss and civilian sacrifice.

- Option B is incorrect because the operation was not named to project mythological or feminine strength.
- Option C misinterprets the symbolism; while *sindoor* is red, the naming wasn't centred on blood or martyrdom.
- Option D is incorrect as the naming does not follow a consistent military tradition linked to rivers or nationalism.

26. Correct Option: C

Explanation: Operation Sindoor was executed from within Indian territory using high-precision weapons like SCALP and HAMMER, allowing India to strike high-value targets without entering Pakistani airspace, reducing escalation risks. This approach represents a strategic evolution in India's retaliatory doctrine.

- Option B is incorrect; no international coalition or foreign logistical support was involved.
- Option D is false; the operation prominently involved the Air Force and advanced aerial systems.

27. Correct Option: C

Explanation: Operation Cactus Lily refers to the coordinated Indian Army-Air Force offensive during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, particularly the river-crossing manoeuvre over the Meghna River towards Dhaka.

- Option A is incorrect; Operation Trident was a naval operation during the 1971 war targeting Karachi, not the Kargil War.
- Option B is incorrect; Operation Riddle was from the 1965 war, not 1971.
- Option D wrongly attributes a naval blockade role to Operation Ablaze, which was a troop mobilisation effort in 1965, not a maritime strike.

28. Correct Option: B

Explanation: Loitering munitions are drones or air-deployed systems capable of circling an area for an extended period and engaging targets as they are identified, combining surveillance with real-time strike capability.

- Option A is incorrect; HAMMER is an air-to-ground guided bomb, not a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
- Option C is inaccurate; SCALP (Storm Shadow) is a long-range air-launched cruise missile, not a short-range bomb.
- Option D is false; Storm Shadow (SCALP) is manufactured by MBDA, a European company, not Israel, and its range exceeds 250 km.

29. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The Tashkent Agreement was signed in January 1966 to formally end hostilities after the 1965 Indo-Pak War, which included military operations like Riddle and Ablaze. The Soviet Union mediated the agreement in Uzbekistan.

- Option A (Simla Agreement) ended the 1971 war, not the 1965 one.
- Option C (Lahore Declaration) pertains to post-1999 efforts at bilateral peace.
- Option D (Delhi Pact) refers to an agreement on minority rights between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, not a wartime resolution.

30. Correct Option: C

Explanation: MBDA is a prominent European multinational defence company specialising in guided weapon systems, including SCALP (Storm Shadow). It supplies advanced munitions to several NATO countries and has participated in combat operations in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine.

- Option A is incorrect; MBDA is not an India-Europe venture and doesn't focus exclusively on submarine-launched weapons.
- Option B misrepresents MBDA as a NATO body; it is a company, not a military alliance.
- Option D incorrectly describes MBDA's function; it deals in weapons, not cybersecurity or espionage software.

Passage 6:

31. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The treaty creates a quid pro quo system wherein pharmaceutical companies get access to global pathogen data and in return, they are required to share 10% of pandemic-related medical supplies (vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics) with the WHO for free and another 10% at affordable prices.

- Option A is incorrect; the percentage is wrong and does not mention free contributions to WHO.
- Option B is inaccurate because there is no such mandate requiring funding healthcare infrastructure.
- Option D misstates the requirement; companies are not obligated to disclose proprietary drug formulas to the WHO.

32. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The GSCL is designed to enhance equitable and timely access to health products during emergencies. It tackles logistical obstacles such as delays, unaffordability, and trade restrictions, ensuring health products reach all countries fairly during global health crises.

- Option C misrepresents GSCL's function, which is supply chain-focused, not virus sequencing.
- Option D inaccurately casts the GSCL as a funding agency for pharma-WHO bilateral deals, which is not its role.

33. Correct Option: C

Explanation: Article 19 of the WHO Constitution allows the World Health Assembly to adopt legally binding conventions or agreements. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), adopted in 2003, was the first and only treaty under this article—until now. The Pandemic Agreement would be the second such treaty, making this statement accurate.

34. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The treaty is structured to maintain national sovereignty. WHO cannot impose lockdowns, vaccine mandates, or travel restrictions. It only facilitates coordination, data-sharing, and technical support. All substantive public health decisions rest with national authorities.

- Option B is incorrect; overriding patents is not a WHO power under this treaty.
- Option C wrongly references the UN Charter, which is unrelated to WHO's treaty.
- Option D falsely claims unilateral intervention powers, which contradicts the treaty's sovereignty-respecting framework

35. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The WHO was officially established on **7 April 1948**, and this date is commemorated globally as **World Health Day**. The organization began operating on this date following the ratification of its constitution.

- Option A is incorrect; 10 December marks Human Rights Day, and the name cited does not exist.
- Option B confuses the founding date of the UN with WHO's timeline.

- Option D is an incorrect date with a fictional day.

36. Correct Option:

B Explanation: WHO functions as an inter-governmental organization with **194 Member States**, operates through **150 country offices** and **six regional offices**, and collaborates primarily through **national Ministries of Health**.

- Option A understates membership and mischaracterizes its operational model.
- Option C misidentifies its headquarters and misstates its powers.
- Option D confuses WHO's mandate with that of UN peacekeeping bodies and introduces a non-existent "Chapter 12."

Passage 7:

37. Correct Option: B

Explanation: In 2025, **139 individuals** were conferred Padma Awards across the three categories—Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan, and Padma Shri. This figure does not include the usual exclusions (posthumous awards, NRIs, OCI holders, and foreigners).

- Option A (131) is close but incorrect.
- Option C (124) is inaccurate and randomly chosen.
- Option D (120) represents the cap excluding special categories and is not the total for 2025.

38. Correct Option: D

Not True The Padma Awards Committee is *not* chaired by the President of India. It is typically headed by the Cabinet Secretary and includes the Home Secretary, Secretary to the President, and eminent persons including former Padma awardees, but not the President or ministers as chair.

39. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The Padma Awards were first instituted in **1954**, along with the Bharat Ratna. They have since become one of India's most prestigious civilian honours.

- Option A (1950) predates the awards' actual institution.
- Option C (1962) is inaccurate and reflects no historical link.
- Option D (1947) refers to Indian independence, not the awards.

40. Correct Option: C

Explanation: In **Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India (1996)**, the Supreme Court held that national awards, including the Padma Awards, **do not amount to titles under Article 18(1)** of the Constitution. Hence, recipients **cannot use them as prefixes or suffixes** to their names.

- Option A misrepresents the nature of the awards.
- Option B is wrong as it wrongly claims they can be suffixed.
- Option D is invalid; there is no separate Article 51 framework governing such awards.

41. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The Padma Awards are open to “all persons without distinction of race, occupation, position or sex.” This inclusivity is a core eligibility principle of the awards.

42. Correct Option: B

Explanation: Since **2014**, there has been an explicit push to honour “**unsung heroes**” from ordinary backgrounds who have done extraordinary service in various fields. This move is popularly referred to as the transformation of Padma Awards into “**People’s Padma**”.

- Option A refers to the annual cap, not a reform.
- Option C incorrectly mentions a new category, which does not exist.
- Option D falsely equates Padma Vibhushan with Bharat Ratna, which remains the highest civilian honour.

Passage 8:

43. Correct Option: A

Explanation: **NISAR** is a NASA-ISRO joint project using synthetic aperture radar to scan Earth’s surface, mapping it every 12 days. It helps monitor changes in ecosystems, groundwater, ice, and hazards like landslides and earthquakes.

- Option B (LUPEX) is lunar-focused, not Earth observation.
- Option C (Megha-Tropiques) is about tropical climate and monsoon-related studies, not global surface mapping.
- Option D (Gaganyaan) is a human spaceflight mission, unrelated to radar-based Earth observation.

44. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The theme of the **2025 GLEX Summit** was “**Reaching New Worlds: A Space Exploration Renaissance**”, indicating a renewed global commitment to space collaboration and innovation.

- Option A is fictitious and refers to Mars, which is not the central focus.
- Option C sounds plausible but is incorrect.
- Option D wrongly focuses on colonization and mining, which were not the summit’s focus.

45. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The **LUPEX mission** is a collaboration between **India and Japan (ISRO and JAXA)** aimed at exploring **Moon's polar regions**, especially permanently shadowed areas to detect water, crucial for future lunar habitats.

- Option A is inaccurate and Mars-related.
- Option B is factually incorrect and wrongly attributes France as a partner.
- Option D confuses LUPEX with older Soviet-Indian cooperation.

46. Correct Option: A

Explanation: NSIL (NewSpace India Limited) NSIL is the current commercial arm of ISRO, established in 2019 under the Department of Space. It is responsible for the commercialization of space products, services, and technologies developed by ISRO. It plays a major role in satellite launches, transponder leasing, and marketing of space-based services.

47. Correct Option: C

Explanation: **Rakesh Sharma** was the **first Indian citizen** to go to space aboard the **Soviet Soyuz T-11** in 1984, becoming a national icon.

- Option A (Kalpana Chawla) was Indian-origin but an American citizen.
- Option B is fictional; Ritu Karidhal has not been on any test mission.
- Option D (Sunita Williams) is also Indian-origin but a U.S. astronaut.

48. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The **International Astronautical Federation (IAF)** is the **co-organisier of GLEX**, a major NGO that includes astronauts, space agencies like ESA and Roscosmos, and national organisations such as ISRO.

- Option A is a UN body for space law and diplomacy, not a GLEX organiser.
- Option B is fictional and has no official presence.
- Option D (WSC) does not exist as a recognised space coordination body

Passage 9:

49. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The **title of the 2025 HDR** is **"A Matter of Choice: People and Possibilities in the Age of AI"**. It focuses on how AI technologies intersect with human development, especially in the context of inequality, job displacement, and opportunity.

- Option B sounds similar but is not the actual title.
- Option C and D are fictional titles with no official usage in the HDR 2025

50. Correct Option: D

Explanation: **South Sudan** ranked last in the 2025 HDR, with an HDI of **0.388**, reflecting severe developmental and humanitarian challenges.

- Option A (Yemen), B (Somalia), and C (Sudan) all rank low globally but were not the lowest in this report. South Sudan continues to suffer from conflict, poverty, and fragile governance, impacting its development indicators.

51. Correct Option: C

Explanation: **Iceland**, the highest-ranked country in HDR 2025, recorded an HDI of **0.972**, owing to its robust social protection systems, education, and healthcare access.

- Option A and D are slightly lower values and do not match Iceland's official ranking.
- Option B overstates the figure.

52. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The **UNDP was founded in 1965** by the UN General Assembly to support sustainable development, especially in the least developed countries. It has since become one of the most important development agencies globally.

- Option A (1955) predates the actual establishment.
- Option C and D are unrelated to UNDP's timeline.

LEGAL REASONING

Passage 10:

53. Correct Option: A

Explanation: P's scenario involves two cumulative requirements under *volenti non fit injuria*: actual knowledge of the specific risk and voluntary consent. First, P signed a waiver alerting to serious injury risk from equipment failure and then received a verbal warning of possible cable corrosion. This satisfies actual knowledge of both the kind (zip-line equipment failure) and a specific defect (cable corrosion) (references to lines describing waiver and warning). Second, although P's consent was influenced by dependency on the tour for transport, the passage clarifies that voluntariness persists if the individual, aware of risk, still chooses to proceed (lines on free consent and caution about real choice). Dependency alone does not automatically vitiate consent if an alternative (refusing and arranging different transport) existed, even if inconvenient (lines on voluntariness and real choice). Option B wrongly assumes no genuine consent simply because of dependency; the passage indicates courts examine whether a real choice existed, not eliminate voluntariness per se. Option C misapplies waiver analysis: *volenti* may apply even when defendant admits defect if plaintiff was informed and consented. Option D overgeneralizes implied consent without addressing the need for specific knowledge and genuine choice. Thus, Option A correctly captures that P had actual knowledge (waiver + warning) and voluntarily consented despite constraints, satisfying the defence requirements.

54. Correct Option: C

Explanation: In this scenario, the driver was informed that braking performance "may be unpredictable at high speeds," satisfying actual knowledge of the kind and magnitude of the risk (lines on warning by engineer). However, the passage emphasizes that voluntary consent must be free from coercion, misrepresentation, or undue pressure. Here, sponsorship obligations create undue pressure that undermines genuine free consent (lines on free consent and caution where no real choice). Option A incorrectly treats general awareness plus waiver as enough; the passage specifies that if consent is vitiated by pressure, *volenti* fails. Option B focuses on misrepresentation by downplaying but is weaker because the driver was still aware of unpredictability; the main issue is undue pressure, not necessarily false information. Option C correctly identifies that sponsorship obligations negate free consent even though knowledge exists. Option D incorrectly posits that implied consent in professional testing always succeeds irrespective of pressure; the passage requires voluntariness unaffected by undue influence. References: lines on actual knowledge (warning) and lines on voluntariness and real choice highlight that economic or contractual pressure can vitiate consent. Hence, Option C is correct.

55. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The passage states that minors lack capacity to consent to specific risks without explicit guardian consent (lines on minors and capacity). Here, although a general membership form and parental consent existed, there was no specific guardian-signed acknowledgement for this high-intensity obstacle course. Therefore, the capacity element fails and *volenti* cannot apply. Option A wrongly assumes general informing suffices; passage requires specific guardian consent for minors. Option B points to hidden defect undermining knowledge, which is relevant but secondary: the primary bar is the minor's incapacity. Option C erroneously treats parental consent to general membership as covering all risks; passage demands specific, informed consent for particular high-risk activities when minors are involved. Option D correctly notes that minors cannot validly consent absent explicit guardian acknowledgement of the precise risks, so *volenti* fails. References: lines discussing minors' lack of capacity and requirement of guardian consent clearly support Option D.

56. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The passage makes clear that consent vitiated by misrepresentation is invalid (lines on free consent and misrepresentation). The worker was assured verbally that harnesses met standards, yet saw worn equipment, indicating a misrepresentation about safety. This misrepresentation prevented true knowledge of the extent of risk and undermined voluntary consent. Option A incorrectly relies on implied consent from awareness of general scaffold risks but ignores the effect of misrepresentation. Option C highlights economic pressure; while economic pressure can affect voluntariness, the passage gives stronger weight to misrepresentation as vitiating consent. Option D overstates implied consent from continuing work despite dangers; misrepresentation negates that. Option B precisely identifies misrepresentation about harness standards vitiating consent, aligning with lines emphasizing that free consent must not stem from false assurances. References: lines on actual knowledge compromised by misrepresentation and lines on free consent vitiation.

57. Correct Option: A

Explanation: Here, P was informed of avalanche risk in a specific valley and told of alternative safer routes requiring more time. This meets actual knowledge of the risk's nature and magnitude. P freely chose the riskier route to satisfy sponsorship schedule; since an alternative existed, voluntariness persists under the passage's guidance on real choice. Option B improperly shifts focus to organiser's duty rather than plaintiff's consent; *volenti* examines plaintiff's awareness and choice. Option C overemphasizes sponsorship pressure; although pressure existed, the availability of an alternative preserves free consent when P knowingly opts for risk. Option D refers to implied consent but is less precise: this instance involves express informed choice. Option A correctly applies that actual knowledge plus

voluntary decision (with alternative available) satisfy cumulative requirements. References: lines on knowledge of specific risk, lines on voluntariness and real choice.

58. Correct Option: D

Explanation: The passage states clearly that *volenti non fit injuria* requires both actual knowledge of the specific risk and genuine voluntary consent; absence of either defeats the defence (lines on two essential cumulative conditions). Option A contradicts cumulative requirement by suggesting either condition suffices. Option B ignores the necessity of comprehending risk magnitude even with implied consent. Option C misreads the voluntariness element, focusing solely on knowledge absence while overlooking that lack of real choice also bars consent. Option D accurately reflects the conjunctive nature: both knowledge and voluntary consent are required, with absence of either negating the defence. References: lines specifying cumulative elements and lines on voluntariness and real choice confirm this interpretation.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Approach to Reading It

The passage explains that *volenti non fit injuria* is a complete defence requiring two cumulative elements: actual knowledge of the specific risk (both its nature and magnitude) and genuine voluntary consent to undertake that risk. It underscores that mere awareness of danger is insufficient; the plaintiff must understand the precise hazard, and consent must be free from coercion, misrepresentation, or incapacity (e.g., minors). Courts also look cautiously at situations where the plaintiff had no meaningful alternative, but a constrained choice does not automatically negate voluntariness if an informed decision was still made. When reading, focus on spotting language about “nature and extent” of risk, how consent is obtained or vitiated, and any capacity or choice constraints.

2) Question-by-Question Approach

- **Question 53 (Zip-line dependency scenario):** *Approach:* Identify references to waiver and verbal warning showing P’s actual knowledge of cable corrosion, then examine voluntariness given dependency on tour for transport—check whether an alternative (refusing and arranging other transport) existed. Map facts to knowledge vs free consent nuance.
- **Question 54 (Racing driver under sponsorship pressure):** *Approach:* Note that driver was told braking unpredictability (specific risk known) but assess if sponsorship obligations amount to undue pressure vitiating voluntary consent. Also consider whether engineer’s downplaying amounts to misrepresentation versus mere emphasis. Focus on pressure versus genuine free choice.
- **Question 55 (Minor in gym obstacle course):** *Approach:* Spot that although general membership and parental consent existed, there was no specific guardian acknowledgement for this high-risk activity, and hidden defect means no actual

knowledge. Critically apply capacity rule: minors cannot validly consent absent explicit, informed guardian sign-off.

- **Question 56 (Construction worker and misrepresented harness):** *Approach:* Determine whether the worker truly understood the risk magnitude given the contractor's assurance (misrepresentation) about harness standards despite visible wear. Evaluate how misrepresentation undermines both actual knowledge and voluntary consent, versus mere economic pressure.
- **Question 57 (Mountaineering with avalanche risk vs schedule pressure):** *Approach:* Observe that P was informed of avalanche risk and alternative safer route; check that P's choice, though driven by schedule, was still informed and had an available alternative—thus voluntary. Contrast scheduling pressure with true absence of choice.
- **Question 58 (Passage-based on cumulative conditions):** *Approach:* Recall the conjunctive requirement that both actual knowledge and genuine consent are needed; eliminate options that treat the elements disjunctively or ignore comprehension of risk magnitude or voluntariness when choice is constrained.

3) All Legal Principles Mentioned in the Passage

- **Volenti non fit injuria Definition:** A complete defence: "to a willing person, no injury is done," when plaintiff voluntarily consents to a known risk.
- **Two Cumulative Conditions:** (a) Actual knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk; (b) Genuine voluntary consent to undertake that risk. Absence of either negates the defence.
- **Actual Knowledge Requirement:** Plaintiff must understand both kind of danger and the magnitude of potential harm; general awareness of danger is insufficient.
- **Voluntary Consent Requirement:** Consent must originate from free will, without coercion, misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, or undue influence.
- **Vitiation by Misrepresentation/Fraud/Mistake:** If plaintiff was misled about nature/magnitude of risk, consent is invalid.
- **Capacity Considerations:** Minors or persons of unsound mind are presumed unable to consent to specific risks; any consent must come via a legally authorised guardian, with explicit acknowledgement of the precise hazard.
- **Implied vs Express Consent:** Defence can arise from express agreement (e.g., waivers) or implied conduct (e.g., voluntarily engaging in a known risky sport), but implied consent still demands actual understanding of the specific risk and freedom to choose.
- **No Real Choice / Constrained Consent:** Courts scrutinise scenarios where plaintiff had little or no realistic alternative; dependency or pressure may vitiate voluntariness if truly no meaningful option existed, but mere inconvenience does not automatically destroy free consent when an informed choice remains.

- **Waivers and Disclaimers:** Signing a waiver indicating risk does not automatically bar liability; it supports knowledge element but must be paired with free consent and no vitiating factors.
- **Defendant's Admission of Risk vs Defence Availability:** A defendant's awareness or admission of a defect does not itself bar volenti if plaintiff was informed and consented; however, if defect was concealed or misrepresented, defence fails.
- **Economic or Sponsorship Pressure:** While financial or contractual pressures may influence choice, voluntariness is assessed by whether the plaintiff truly had an informed alternative; undue pressure may vitiate consent if no realistic option existed.
- **Express Warning vs Downplaying Risks:** A warning that downplays risk magnitude may amount to misrepresentation if it prevents plaintiff from appreciating full extent; however, if risk was communicated but choice pressured, focus is on whether consent was genuinely voluntary.
- **Duty of Caution by Courts:** Courts apply volenti cautiously, especially in contexts of power imbalance or necessity; they analyse underlying facts to see if knowledge was informed and consent truly free.
- **Burden of Proof:** Defendant relying on volenti must show plaintiff knew the precise risk and consented freely; ambiguous or equivocal facts on either element defeat the defence.

Passage 11:

59. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The employee remained on the premises after formal permission had expired and engaged in direct physical interference by moving cables and using equipment. Under the principles of trespass to land, any unauthorized presence or activity on another's property constitutes trespass per se—no proof of intent or actual damage is required. The passage specifies that staying beyond revoked permission is itself trespass, and physical acts like handling cables or equipment clearly interfere with possession. There is no general "necessity" exception in the text that would allow after-hours troubleshooting to override the revoked access rights, nor any indication that such operational emergencies create implied permission. Therefore, the employee is liable for trespass.

Option B suggests a necessity exception for critical server work, but the passage only mentions narrow, recognized exceptions (e.g., implied parking rights in specific tenancy contexts), not broad emergency overrides.

Option C wrongly asserts that accidental presence without intent or damage cannot be trespass; in fact, the tort is actionable per se, and even mistaken entry can give rise to liability absent an applicable exception.

Option D mischaracterizes the interference as indirect nuisance; moving tangible objects and using premises equipment are direct, physical interferences, fitting trespass rather than nuisance. Thus, given the unauthorized stay and direct interference, Option A correctly applies the trespass principles.

60. Correct Option: B

Explanation: Here, the surveyor invited to inspect ground-floor inadvertently enters first-floor terrace through an unlocked door. Exceeding scope of permission is trespass (line 15–17). But because the boundary was ambiguous and entry was unintentional, the passage says mere unintentional crossing may not be trespass (line 17).

Option B states no trespass because ambiguous boundary and absence of intention or knowledge means unintentional crossing may not attract liability—this aligns with line 17 and line 11 (accidental entry may still be trespass unless exception; here ambiguity may qualify as exception).

Option A is incorrect because it ignores ambiguity provision (line 17).

Option C is incorrect: taking measurements is indeed a physical act but entry was unintentional; the passage requires direct physical interference, but unintentional entry in ambiguous boundary may not be trespass (line 17).

Option D wrongly asserts implied permission extends to entire property without restriction; the passage emphasises explicit scope, and implied permission only arises in specific circumstances (line 17). Thus Option B matches the passage’s guidance on ambiguous boundaries and unintentional crossing.

61. Correct Option: C

Explanation: Allowing animals to stray onto neighbour’s land is direct physical interference and thus trespass per se (line on “allowing animals to stray” as trespass). When the cow ate crops, its unauthorized presence on the field constitutes trespass, regardless of how it arrived. Further, the neighbour’s act of detaining the cow overnight without the owner’s consent continues the direct interference with the owner’s possession (line on “interference must be direct and physical”). Intent or damage is not required to establish trespass (line on “intent, force, or damage are not required”), so the neighbour’s control over the animal overnight remains trespass. There is no recognized exception for detaining stray livestock pending compensation—this is not akin to the narrow implied parking right in *Madhav Vithal Kudwa*.

A is incorrect since Treating overnight detention as merely “remedial” ignores that keeping another’s animal without permission is unauthorized interference, hence trespass.

B is incorrect since a broken fence does not imply permission; trespass focuses on unauthorized presence, not fence condition and

D is incorrect as Animal intrusion is direct, not indirect; the passage explicitly classifies stray animals entering another's land as trespass, not nuisance.

62. Correct Option: B

Explanation: Under the passage, dust settling on a neighbour's property is an indirect or consequential interference ("allowing smoke, fumes, or waste to spread onto a neighbour's land would be treated as nuisance, not trespass"), so the claim for dust must proceed as nuisance, not trespass. Conversely, parking heavy machinery wheels partly on the neighbour's driveway constitutes a direct physical intrusion onto their land ("direct and physical, involving a tangible object or presence"), and trespass is actionable per se regardless of damage or intent. Thus, the machinery wheels scenario fits trespass per se, while the dust scenario fits nuisance.

Why A is incorrect: It wrongly treats dust as direct interference warranting trespass; the passage clearly classifies airborne particulates settling on adjacent land as indirect interference, hence nuisance. It also mislabels machinery parking as indirect, whereas it is direct physical intrusion.

Why C is incorrect: The passage does not recognize a de minimis exception for slight discoloration; even minimal interference can ground a nuisance action. Nor does it excuse machinery intrusion on grounds of ambiguous boundaries—parking wheels partly on the driveway is a clear, unauthorized physical presence, so trespass applies.

Why D is incorrect: It misapplies "actionable per se" to dust, treating indirect interference as trespass; in fact, per the passage only direct interferences are trespass. It also posits an implied licence for machinery parking without support: no implied right to park on a neighbour's driveway is indicated, so trespass liability stands for the wheels on the neighbour's land.

63. Correct Option: A

Explanation: Tenant has permission to use garden but not garage. Parking in garage exceeds scope of permission (line 15–16). Trespass arises when one exceeds granted permission (line 15–16). Option A states tenant liable for trespass by exceeding scope—this aligns with passage. Option B wrongly implies broad implied permission (passage emphasises specific scope, line 15). Option C wrongly treats parking as indirect interference (parking is direct physical interference, line 2). Option D suggests no liability if no inconvenience—passage's exception for implied permission based on no inconvenience appears only in the specific Madhav Vithal Kudwa context (line 19), not a general rule for tenants. Here tenancy agreement excluded garage; no implied right. Thus Option A correctly follows passage: exceeding permission is trespass (line 15–16), so tenant liable.

64. Correct Option: C

Explanation: Passage distinguishes trespass as direct physical interference with possession actionable per se without proof of damage (line 1–4, line 10–11) and nuisance as indirect or consequential interference (line 12–14). Option C captures this: trespass is direct, actionable per se, whereas nuisance covers indirect interferences. Option A is wrong because trespass does not require proof of damage (but nuisance may require proof of damage). Option B inverts the roles (it says trespass involves indirect, which is wrong). Option D wrongly states they overlap entirely; passage distinguishes them substantively (line 12). Therefore Option C aligns directly with lines 1–4 and line 12.

65. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The Madhav Vithal Kudwa exception states that a tenant had implied right to park in compound without explicit permission, provided it did not inconvenience others (line 19).

Option A: implied permission may arise for beneficial or non-inconvenient uses within tenancy, preventing trespass claims for expected activities—this matches line 19.

Option B: contradicts line 19 (requires explicit permission irrespective of inconvenience).

Option C: mischaracterizes parking as non-physical or relates to animals; passage says parking is a use but here treated as implied permission if no inconvenience.

Option D: overgeneralizes that parking always outside implied permission; but line 19 shows parking may fall within implied permission if no inconvenience. Thus Option A correctly reflects the principle at line 19.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach The passage defines trespass to land as direct, physical interference with another’s possession, actionable per se without proof of damage or intent, and distinguishes it from nuisance (indirect or consequential interference). It outlines forms of trespass (unauthorized entry, overstaying permission, direct physical acts) and highlights that even accidental entry can constitute trespass unless a recognized exception (e.g., implied permission in specific contexts) applies. When reading, the test taker should focus on spotting language indicating: (a) direct versus indirect interference, (b) whether permission was granted or exceeded, (c) absence of need for intent or damage, and (d) any exceptions or ambiguous boundaries that might negate liability.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches

- **Question 59 (Employee stays after permission revoked):** *Approach:* Note that permission expired at 5 PM and the employee continued physical acts (moving cables, using equipment). Apply direct interference and “permission expired” rule (passage lines 7–8, 10–11): trespass per se even if unintentional or for necessity, unless a clear exception exists.

- **Question 60 (Surveyor's unintentional entry to terrace):** *Approach:* The surveyor exceeded the invited scope (ground floor) by entering first-floor terrace, but boundary ambiguity and lack of intent point to the exception for unintentional crossing (passage line 17). Focus on whether ambiguous access negates trespass despite direct entry.
- **Question 61 (Cow straying and neighbour's handling):** *Approach:* Allowing animals to stray is direct interference (passage line 8). Keeping or driving the animal also engages possession. Determine if any implied exception (e.g., necessity) applies; absent such recognized exception, unauthorised presence and detention are trespass.
- **Question 62 (Factory dust vs machinery wheels):** *Approach:* Distinguish indirect intrusion (dust settling) as nuisance (passage lines 12–14) and direct physical intrusion (machinery wheels on driveway) as trespass (lines 2–4). Check actionable per se principle applies only to direct interference.
- **Question 63 (Tenant parks in garage beyond permission):** *Approach:* Tenant's rights cover garden but exclude garage; parking exceeds scope of permission (passage lines 15–16). Apply direct interference rule: unauthorized use of garage is trespass, regardless of inconvenience.
- **Question 64 (Trespass vs nuisance distinction):** *Approach:* Recall that trespass is direct physical interference actionable per se without damage proof (lines 1–4, 10–11), whereas nuisance covers indirect or consequential interference (lines 12–14). Eliminate options reversing or conflating these roles.
- **Question 65 (Madhav Vithal Kudwa implied parking right):** *Approach:* Identify that the exception grants implied permission to park in compound when non-inconvenient (passage line 19). Look for wording about "implied right... provided it did not inconvenience others" to confirm scope of implied permission.

3) All Legal Principles Mentioned in the Passage

- **Definition of Trespass to Land:** Unlawful, direct physical interference with another's possession of land (line 1–2).
- **Actionable Per Se:** No need to prove actual damage, intent, or force; mere interference suffices (lines 3–4, 10–11).
- **Forms of Trespass:**
 - Unauthorized entry onto land (line 6).
 - Remaining after permission expired or revoked (line 7).
 - Direct physical acts interfering with land (e.g., throwing stones, allowing animals to stray) (line 8).
- **No Interference, No Trespass:** If there is no interference with possession, trespass does not occur (line 9).

- **Accidental or Mistaken Entry:** Even accidental entry can be trespass unless a recognized exception applies (line 11).
- **Direct vs Indirect Interference:** Indirect or consequential acts (smoke, fumes, roots spreading) fall under nuisance, not trespass (lines 12–14).
- **Scope of Permission:** Exceeding the boundaries of granted permission constitutes trespass (line 15–16); ambiguous boundaries may negate liability for unintentional crossing (line 17).
- **Exceptions & Implied Permission:** Specific exceptions (e.g., implied right to park where non-inconvenient, as in *Madhav Vithal Kudwa*) can preclude trespass liability when interference is expected and non-prejudicial (line 19).
- **Distinction from Nuisance:** Trespass addresses direct physical intrusion; nuisance addresses indirect, consequential interferences (lines 12–14, 20).
- **Animals Straying:** Allowing animals to stray onto another's land is direct trespass (line 8).
- **Trees and Roots:** Planting a tree on another's land is trespass; roots/branches encroaching from one's own land onto neighbour's land is nuisance (line 14).
- **No Requirement of Intent or Damage:** Liability attaches irrespective of whether interference was intentional or caused harm (lines 10–11).
- **Ambiguity of Boundaries:** When boundaries between permitted and non-permitted areas are unclear, unintentional crossing may not constitute trespass (line 17).
- **Implied Rights in Tenancy/Shared Areas:** A tenant or occupant may have implied rights for uses that do not inconvenience others, preventing trespass actions for such expected activities (line 19).

Passage 12:

66. Correct Option: A

Explanation: In this scenario, the FIR arises from a dispute over unpaid dues under a civil contract, which prima facie discloses no cognizable criminal offence. The passage states that courts may quash proceedings when the dispute is purely civil in nature (line 13). Although the police investigation has not concluded (line 5 indicates High Courts should not short-circuit legitimate investigations), here there is no foundation for any cognizable offence because the allegations solely concern breach of contract. Hence, permitting the FIR to proceed would amount to misuse of criminal law to resolve a civil dispute, subverting justice (lines 1–4, 13). Option B is incorrect because, while the High Court is cautious about quashing before investigation concludes (line 10), that principle does not override the clear absence of any cognizable offence. Option C is incorrect because there is no plausible criminal element to preserve for investigation; taken at face value, the FIR discloses only a civil matter (line 5). Option D misstates discretion: the power under Section 482 is to be

exercised sparingly (line 3) and not simply because the accused prefers civil adjudication; it hinges on whether a cognizable offence is disclosed. Thus, A correctly applies the “purely civil dispute” exception (line 13).

67. Correct Option: C

Explanation: Here, although the FIR alleges sexual harassment by the coach with some general allegations and possible animus, the High Court must examine whether, taken at face value, the allegations disclose a cognizable offence (line 5). Sexual harassment is a cognizable offence, and detailed inquiry into truth or falsity is for trial (lines 10–12). The preliminary inquiry stage does not permit quashing simply because allegations seem general or motivated by personal animus absent proof that they disclose no offence. Option A is incorrect because malice alone does not justify quashing if allegations, on their face, disclose a cognizable offence (line 6: mala fide must clearly render allegations untenable). Option B is incorrect in form because while quashing before charge sheet may short-circuit investigation (line 10), this is subordinate to the requirement that the allegations must not disclose an offence; here they do. Option D is incorrect because the High Court should not delve into adequacy of evidence at this stage (line 11) or presume insufficiency; that is for trial. Option C correctly reflects that since the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the offence, the petition must be dismissed and investigation/trial allowed to proceed (lines 5–6, 10–12).

68. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The passage states that High Courts may quash proceedings where a statutory bar exists to criminal prosecution (line on “courts can quash proceedings in cases where a statutory bar exists to criminal prosecution”). Here, defamation under the relevant statute is non-cognizable unless the aggrieved person files a written complaint, and that mandatory procedural requirement was not met. Since the FIR arises from a complaint lacking the required statutory compliance, it is legally untenable from the outset. Allowing such proceedings to continue would subvert justice by subjecting the accused to trial despite the clear statutory bar. Thus, the High Court should quash the FIR without waiting for investigation, as no cognizable offence is disclosed due to the procedural defect. **Why A is incorrect:** It suggests deeper examination of truth or public interest is needed; however, the presence of a statutory bar means the matter cannot proceed at all, so there is no stage at which truth-finding could legitimize the FIR. **Why C is incorrect:** It argues for permitting investigation despite a procedural defect, but when a statutory bar precludes prosecution ab initio, investigation is futile and courts should quash immediately rather than short-circuiting a potentially legitimate probe. **Why D is incorrect:** Although superficially similar, this option describes quashing a “frivolous FIR,” whereas the correct basis here is the statutory bar rendering the FIR legally untenable; labeling it “frivolous” is less precise than citing the mandatory procedural non-compliance, which is the definitive ground for quashing under Section 482.

69. Correct Option: D

Explanation: The passage states that when considering a quashing petition under Section 482, the High Court must take the FIR allegations at face value and determine if they disclose a cognizable offence; if they appear absurd or improbable, the Court may quash the FIR to prevent a miscarriage of justice (line 5–6). Here, the entrepreneur’s allegations rest solely on speculative future gains without any concrete transactions, making them far-fetched and improbable on their face. Thus, the High Court is justified in quashing the FIR at this stage, since proceeding to investigation or trial on such implausible allegations would subvert justice. Option A is incorrect because, while it is true that trial ultimately determines veracity, the High Court need not await trial if the allegations, even taken as true, do not disclose any reasonable basis for a cognizable offence. Option B is incorrect because it overstates the need for prima facie evidence; if allegations are inherently absurd or improbable such that no cognizable offence is disclosed, quashing is appropriate despite any theoretical possibility. Option C is close but misleading in tone: it suggests that “improbable and absurd allegations alone justify quashing,” but the passage emphasizes that the Court “may” quash in such circumstances rather than automatically doing so; Option D more accurately reflects the discretionary nature (“may quash ... to avert abuse of process”) aligned with the passage’s cautious approach. Therefore, Option D best captures the correct application of the “absurd or improbable” ground for quashing under Section 482.

70. Correct Option: A

Explanation: In this case, the police have found prima facie evidence of fund diversion, indicating a cognizable offence and a continuing legitimate investigation. The passage emphasizes that the High Court must not short-circuit legitimate investigations (lines 10–12), and quashing is an exceptional remedy, not the general rule (line 14). Allegations of political vendetta alone do not suffice to quash when prima facie offence is disclosed (lines 4–6, 10). Option B is incorrect because quashing solely on politicization ignores the prima facie evidence requiring trial. Option C is incorrect because it misstates that vendetta allegations require trial-level scrutiny; rather, vendetta may be raised during trial but does not justify quashing at the threshold if offence is disclosed. Option D is incorrect because exceptional power cannot override the need to allow legitimate investigation when prima facie case exists (line 10). Option A correctly applies the principle that, since a cognizable offence is disclosed and investigation is ongoing legitimately, quashing would improperly short-circuit inquiry (lines 5–6, 10–12).

71. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The passage instructs that the High Court examines whether, even if allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, they disclose a cognizable offence; if not, or if allegations are absurd, improbable, or mala fide, the Court may quash (lines 5–6, 13). It also cautions against detailed inquiry into truth or evidence sufficiency at this stage (lines 10–12). Option

A is incorrect because quashing is not based merely on inconvenience to accused or their preference (lines 3, 14). Option B is incorrect because the Court need not always await completion of investigation if allegations disclose no offence or are clearly untenable (lines 5–6, 13). Option D is incorrect because High Courts must not evaluate evidence sufficiency at quashing stage (line 11). Option C correctly encapsulates the High Court’s approach: take allegations at face value, check for cognizable offence or absurd/mala fide nature, and quash if those conditions warrant (lines 5–6, 10–13).

72. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The passage repeatedly underscores that Section 482 power is discretionary, to be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and only in exceptional circumstances to prevent miscarriage of justice (lines 3–4, 14). Option A is incorrect because it suggests liberal use, contrary to the “sparingly, cautiously” mandate (line 3). Option C is incorrect because High Courts must not substitute their own view of evidence at quashing stage; they avoid detailed evidence evaluation (lines 10–12). Option D is incorrect because quashing requires more than mere vexatious complaint; the Court must ensure no cognizable offence or clear misuse, not quash indiscriminately (lines 5–6, 13). Option B correctly states the governing principle of sparing, cautious exercise in exceptional cases (lines 3, 14), aligning with the passage’s explicit guidance.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach The passage outlines High Courts’ inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash FIRs or proceedings in exceptional cases—specifically where continuing would subvert justice (e.g., purely civil disputes, statutory bars, mala fide complaints) while avoiding short-circuiting legitimate investigations. It emphasizes a cautious, sparing exercise: examining allegations at face value to see if they disclose a cognizable offence or are absurd/improbable. When reading, the test taker should focus on key trigger phrases such as “taken at face value,” “sparingly, cautiously, exceptional,” “not short-circuit legitimate investigations,” and the enumerated exceptions (statutory bar, purely civil dispute, misuse). Attention to these markers helps gauge whether a factual scenario fits grounds for quashing.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches

- **Question 66 (Civil contractual dispute FIR):** *Approach:* Identify that the FIR stems from a civil contract issue; apply the “purely civil dispute” exception (line 13) and check if allegations, on face value, disclose no cognizable offence. Recognize caution on investigation (lines 10–12) but override when no offence is disclosed.
- **Question 67 (Sexual harassment FIR with general allegations):** *Approach:* Determine whether, taken at face value, the allegations disclose a cognizable offence of sexual harassment (lines 5–6). Recall courts must avoid detailed merits inquiry (lines 10–12) and cannot quash purely due to alleged malice if offence prima facie exists.

- **Question 68 (Defamation FIR lacking statutory compliance):** *Approach:* Spot the statutory bar to criminal prosecution for defamation without mandatory compliance (line 13). Since allegations are untenable ab initio, quashing is appropriate without trial or investigation.
- **Question 69 (Speculative financial scheme FIR):** *Approach:* Examine whether allegations, at face value, disclose a cognizable offence or appear absurd/improbable (line 6). If wholly speculative with no concrete elements, quashing prevents abuse of process.
- **Question 70 (Misappropriation FIR with prima facie evidence & political vendetta claim):**
Approach: Note that there is prima facie evidence disclosing a cognizable offence and an ongoing legitimate investigation (lines 5–6, 10–12). Political vendetta allegations do not override the need to allow investigation when offence is prima facie disclosed.
- **Question 71 (Passage-based on High Court's approach):** *Approach:* Recall that the Court must take allegations at face value to see if they disclose a cognizable offence or are absurd/mala fide (lines 5–6, 13), without delving into evidence sufficiency or awaiting full investigation when exceptions clearly apply.
- **Question 72 (Passage-based on quashing power principle):** *Approach:* Focus on the discretionary nature described as “sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional circumstances” (lines 3–4, 14), ensuring quashing only when continuation would cause miscarriage of justice.

3) All Legal Principles Mentioned in the Passage

- **Inherent Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC:** High Courts can prevent abuse of process and ensure justice is not subverted by procedural misuse (line 1).
- **Quashing FIR/Proceedings:** One key application of this power is quashing frivolous, malicious, or legally untenable FIRs (line 2).
- **Discretionary and Exceptional Exercise:** The power is discretionary, to be used sparingly, cautiously, and only in exceptional circumstances (line 3).
- **Miscarriage of Justice Test:** The guiding principle is whether allowing proceedings to continue would amount to miscarriage of justice (line 4).
- **Face-Value Examination:** High Court examines allegations at face value—if, even taking allegations as true, they do not disclose a cognizable offence, quashing may be warranted (lines 5–6).
- **No Short-Circuiting Investigations:** Courts must not short-circuit legitimate investigations by delving into truth/falsity or sufficiency of evidence at quashing stage (lines 10–12).
- **Material Facts Assessment:** The High Court considers FIR, statements, and supporting documents to see if continuation serves justice (line 9).

- **Statutory Bar Exception:** Quashing is appropriate when a statutory bar exists to criminal prosecution (e.g., procedural non-compliance in defamation) (line 13).
- **Purely Civil Dispute Exception:** If the dispute is purely civil in nature, criminal proceedings may be quashed to prevent misuse (line 13).
- **Misuse/Personal Scores Exception:** Quashing can occur where criminal law is misused to settle personal vendettas or scores (line 13).
- **No Detailed Inquiry at Quashing Stage:** High Courts should not engage in detailed factual or evidentiary analysis—that is reserved for trial (lines 10–12).
- **Petition Procedure:** Accused may petition High Court; State and complainant are respondents; Court assesses all material facts (lines 7–9).
- **Exceptional Remedy, Not General Rule:** Quashing is an extraordinary remedy and not the norm; default is to allow investigation/trial unless strong grounds exist (line 14).
- **Balancing Interests:** Objective is to protect innocent persons from undue trial hardship while preserving prosecutorial rights of victims and investigative prerogatives of law enforcement (line 15).
- **Timing Considerations:** While courts exercise caution about quashing before investigation concludes, clear absence of cognizable offence or presence of exceptions may justify early intervention (lines 5–6, 10–12, 13).
- **Absurd/Improbable/Mala Fide Allegations:** If allegations appear absurd or improbable on their face, or are clearly mala fide, quashing is permissible (line 6).

Passage 13:

73. Correct Option: C

Explanation: In this scenario, S knowingly conceals a lien on the machinery while representing it as unencumbered, intending to mislead B into contracting. That satisfies the elements of fraud: intentional deception to secure unfair advantage (line 3), concealing material facts with dishonest intent (line 4–5), as in the example at line 6. The buyer’s inducement and subsequent rescission plus damages claim align with remedies for proven fraud (line 7–8). Option A is incorrect because it treats the concealment as negligence; here, S’s conduct is intentional, not an honest mistake (contrary to line 9–11). Option B is wrong: the lien directly affects title—a material fact—so it is neither collateral nor irrelevant. Option D wrongly categorizes the concealment as negligent misrepresentation; since S knew of the lien and intended to mislead, it is not mere negligence (line 5). The correct classification is fraud (line 3–6, line 7–8), making Option C the right answer.

74. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The financial advisor relied on outdated reports in good faith, genuinely believing the stock was unencumbered, and did not intend to deceive C. This fits misrepresentation under Section 18: false statement made without intent to mislead but arising from honest mistake or negligence (line 9–11). The remedy is rescission of the investment contract or unwindment, but heavy damages for fraud are not appropriate absent dishonesty (line 13–14). Option A is incorrect because it treats the advisor’s conduct as fraud despite lack of dishonest intent; mere failure to verify does not equate to intentional deception (line 9–11). Option C is incorrect because the statement about regulatory restrictions is a statement of fact, not mere opinion—insofar as it was presented as fact. Option D wrongly asserts that negligent advice qualifies as fraud under Section 17; the passage clearly distinguishes misrepresentation arising from honest error from deliberate falsehood (line 3–5, line 9–11). Therefore, Option B correctly characterizes the remedy as rescission for misrepresentation without entitlement to heavy damages.

75. Correct Option: D

Explanation: Here, the vendor promises performance within three weeks while knowing resource constraints make timely delivery impossible, intending to induce the buyer to contract. This is a promise made without intention to perform, concealing inability to deliver, which constitutes fraud under Section 17: deliberate falsehood to secure unfair advantage (line 3–5, line 6 example applies to promises without intention to perform). Option A is incorrect because time estimates given without intention to perform are material promises; they go beyond mere subjective projection (line 4–5). Option B is wrong since this is more than a subjective estimate: vendor knowingly misrepresented capacity. Option C is incorrect because the vendor did have knowledge of constraints, so cannot be said to believe performance possible; absence of intent to perform makes it fraud, not misrepresentation (line 3–5). Thus, Option D accurately identifies dishonest intent and fraudulent promise, fitting fraud’s greater legal consequences (line 7 for damages entitlement).

76. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The owner assured clear title based on an old survey, unaware of a recent encumbrance. This reflects misrepresentation: a false statement made without intent to deceive, arising from honest mistake (line 9–11, line 12 example). The contract is voidable at the lessee’s option, but damages beyond costs may not be available if owner acted in good faith (line 13–14). Option B is incorrect because mere failure to verify does not automatically amount to fraud absent evidence of dishonest intent (line 5, line 9–11). Option C is wrong: the encumbrance directly affects title, so consent was defective; this is not outside misrepresentation. Option D incorrectly classifies it as fraud by asserting dishonest intent from failure to verify; but passage instructs that honest belief negates fraud (line 9–11, line

14). Therefore, Option A correctly describes the scenario as misrepresentation with limited remedy.

77. Correct Option: A

Explanation: The purchaser relied on seller's assurance drawn from an outdated catalogue; seller genuinely believed the catalogue accurate. This is classic misrepresentation: false statement without intent to deceive, arising from honest mistake or negligence (line 9–11, line 12 illustration). The contract is voidable at buyer's option; damage entitlement depends on good faith (line 13–14). Option B is incorrect because requiring personal verification does not automatically imply dishonest intent; seller believed the catalogue's accuracy and did not deliberately mislead (line 9–11). Option C is wrong: authenticity dispute does not fall outside consent vitiation—false belief about originality vitiates consent. Option D misstates that damages always follow misrepresentation; the passage clarifies that misrepresentation may not always attract damages if acted in good faith (line 14). Thus, Option A best fits misrepresentation under Section 18.

78. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The passage emphasizes that fraud involves deliberate deception or promises without intent to perform, indicating dishonest intent under Section 17 (lines 3–6, line 15–16), whereas misrepresentation arises from honest mistakes or negligence without intent to deceive (lines 9–11, line 14). Option A is incorrect because misrepresentation does not require dishonest intent (contrary to line 9–11). Option C is wrong: misrepresentation does not always allow damages; absence of intent often precludes heavy damages (line 13–14), and fraud allows both rescission and damages. Option D is incorrect since the passage distinguishes legal consequences for fraud and misrepresentation (line 17–18). Therefore, Option B accurately captures the distinction: deliberate or reckless falsehood versus honest error without intent.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach

The passage contrasts fraud (Section 17) and misrepresentation (Section 18) under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, emphasizing that both vitiate consent and render a contract voidable but differ in intent: fraud involves intentional or reckless falsehood to secure unfair advantage, whereas misrepresentation arises from honest mistakes or negligence without intent to deceive. Remedies differ accordingly—fraud entitles the aggrieved party to rescind and claim damages, while misrepresentation typically allows rescission with limited or no damages if made in good faith. When reading, the test taker should note cues on intent and knowledge (e.g., “knowingly”, “genuinely believing”), identify whether false statements were deliberate or inadvertent, and then map those facts to the appropriate remedy framework.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches

- **Question 73 (Concealment of lien by seller):** Focus on whether S acted with dishonest intent in concealing the lien. Since the question states S “knowingly conceals” a material fact to induce B, map to fraud (lines 3–6). Discard misrepresentation readings because intent is explicit.
- **Question 74 (Advisor relying on outdated reports):** Determine if advisor genuinely believed the advice (honest mistake) or acted recklessly. The scenario describes good faith belief based on outdated reports, fitting misrepresentation (lines 9–11, line 12 example). Reject fraud because no intent to deceive.
- **Question 75 (Unrealistic performance promise):** Check if vendor knew inability yet promised performance. “Knowing constraints” implies intention to induce contract by false promise, classifying as fraud (lines 3–6). Do not treat as mere projection.
- **Question 76 (Owner’s assurance based on old survey):** Ascertain whether owner genuinely believed title was clear (honest mistake) or was reckless. The question states belief in good faith based on old survey, pointing to misrepresentation (lines 9–11, line 12 example).
- **Question 77 (Outdated catalogue authenticity):** Examine seller’s belief about authenticity: since seller believed catalogue accurate, this is misrepresentation by honest mistake (lines 9–11). Dismiss any notion of deliberate concealment absent evidence of intent.
- **Question 78 (Passage-based distinction):** Recall the central theme: fraud = deliberate or reckless falsehood to induce contract (lines 3–6, 15–16); misrepresentation = inadvertent error without intent (lines 9–11, 14). Eliminate options conflating intent or misallocating remedies.

3) All Legal Principles Mentioned in the Passage

- **Defective Consent Vitiates:** Both fraud and misrepresentation vitiate consent, making contracts voidable at the aggrieved party’s option (lines 1–2, line 17).
- **Definition of Fraud (Section 17):** Intentional deception to secure unfair advantage, including knowingly false statements, concealment of material facts, or promises made without intention to perform (lines 3–6).
- **Essence of Fraud—Dishonest Intent:** Central element is the party’s dishonest intention to mislead (line 5).
- **Example of Fraud:** Falsely claiming authority to sell property when no such authority exists (line 6).
- **Remedies for Fraud:** Aggrieved party can rescind the contract and claim damages for losses suffered (lines 7–8).
- **Burden of Proof in Fraud:** Claimant must prove the false representation was made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly, and that it induced entry into the contract (line 8).

- **Definition of Misrepresentation (Section 18):** False statements made without intent to deceive, typically arising from honest mistakes, negligence, or misunderstandings (lines 9–11).
- **Example of Misrepresentation:** Assurance based on outdated records that land is unencumbered when in fact it is mortgaged (line 12).
- **Remedies for Misrepresentation:** Contract is voidable at the misled party's option; damages may not always be available if the responsible party acted in good faith (lines 13–14).
- **Distinction in Intent and Knowledge:** Fraud involves deliberate or reckless falsehood; misrepresentation stems from inadvertent error or negligence without intent to deceive (lines 15–16).
- **Consequential Legal Consequences:** Fraud carries greater legal consequences (rescission plus damages), whereas misrepresentation is treated more leniently due to absence of mala fide intention (lines 17–18).
- **Good Faith Consideration:** Absence of dishonest intent in misrepresentation limits or negates damages liability (line 14).
- **Voidable Nature Commonality:** Both defects allow the aggrieved party to void the contract, but the severity of consequences differs (lines 1–2, line 17).
- **Materiality of Facts:** Fraud centers on concealment or false statement of material facts (lines 4–6); misrepresentation may involve material facts believed true.
- **Promises Without Intention to Perform:** Such promises, when known unperformable, constitute fraud, not mere opinion or projection (lines 3–6).
- **Negligence vs Recklessness:** Honest mistakes or negligence without intent fall under misrepresentation; reckless disregard for truth may approach fraud if intent can be inferred (lines 8–11).
- **Inducement Requirement:** Both torts require that the false statement induced the party to enter the contract (line 8).
- **Remedial Scope:** Fraud entitles to rescission and damages; misrepresentation typically entitles only to rescission or limited restitution for costs incurred.

Passage 14:

79. Correct Option: B

Explanation: The assembly began lawfully but changed objective to threaten property damage, falling within prohibited categories (resisting execution by threats of mischief) (line 4). Once the group's object shifted to unlawful purpose, it became an unlawful assembly. P supported the new plan, making him a member at that time. Under constructive liability, if an offence (vandalism) is committed in furtherance of the common unlawful object, every member at that time is equally guilty, regardless of personal participation (line 6). Option A

is incorrect because liability does not require personal commission of the offence; constructive liability covers all members (line 6). Option C is wrong since membership and support during the shift implicate P despite initial lawful participation (line 4). Option D misstates that absence of physical presence limits liability; the provision treats supporters as members once objective changes (line 5, line 6).

80. Correct Option: C

Explanation: X hired and encouraged participation to resist execution of policy—a prohibited objective—rendering the assembly unlawful once that purpose materializes (line 3). Although X was not physically present, anyone who hires or encourages others to join an unlawful assembly is punishable as though a member (line 5). Option A is incorrect because physical presence is not required for member liability when encouragement is present (line 5). Option B wrongly limits constructive liability to physical attendees; the passage explicitly includes instigators or facilitators (line 5). Option D separates abetting from unlawful assembly liability, but under the framework, encouragement equals membership liability (line 5).

81. Correct Option: D

Explanation: The five individuals formed an assembly that shifted from lawful protest to unlawful trespass (resisting execution of law) (line 3). The assault on the officer occurred in furtherance of the group's common unlawful object to trespass and obstruct law enforcement. Under constructive liability, every member at that time is equally guilty of offences committed in furtherance of the common object, regardless of personal participation (line 6). Option A is incorrect because liability extends beyond those physically committing assault (line 6). Option B ignores that the assembly became unlawful once trespass objective emerged (line 3, line 4). Option C misapplies constructive liability by excluding assault since assault occurred during the unlawful assembly; the offence committed furthers the object and implicates all members (line 6).

82. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The assembly's objective to resist execution of law was unlawful; when a member uses violence against officials or damages property in pursuit of that object, the offence of rioting applies. The passage states that if any member uses force to pursue the group's unlawful objective, all members are guilty of rioting, emphasizing collective nature of violence (line 7). Option A is incorrect because constructive liability for rioting does not require personal physical act; mere membership at the time suffices (line 7). Option B is wrong; the initial peaceful assembly became unlawful when resisting law execution, and subsequent violence triggers rioting liability (line 4, line 7). Option D is incorrect because liability does not hinge on prior knowledge of violence; sharing the unlawful object and remaining part of assembly when violence occurs is enough (line 7).

83. Correct Option: A

Explanation: Unlawful assembly is defined as a gathering of five or more persons sharing a prohibited common objective (line 1). Here only four persons convened; even with intent to deprive a neighbor of legal rights, the number requirement is unmet, so it does not constitute unlawful assembly under the framework. Option B is incorrect because number threshold is essential (line 1). Option C misinterprets trespass as automatically creating unlawful assembly regardless of number; the passage requires five or more (line 1). Option D wrongly excludes force requirement as necessary; while force or threat may define prohibited object, the primary disqualifier here is insufficient number (line 1).

84. Correct Option: C

Explanation: The passage defines the principle of constructive liability by stating that “if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in furtherance of the group’s common object, every person who was a member of the assembly at that time is held equally guilty of that offence, regardless of whether they personally took part in the criminal act” (line describing constructive liability). Option C precisely mirrors this: all members are equally guilty if the offence furthers the common unlawful object, irrespective of personal participation.

Why A is incorrect: It limits liability to those who physically commit the offence or later admit participation, whereas the passage makes clear that liability attaches to all members present when the offence occurs, regardless of whether they acted or admitted involvement.

Why B is incorrect: It requires that each member directly intended the specific offence at the outset; the passage instead focuses on whether the offence was committed in furtherance of the common object, not on each member’s specific intent for that act.

Why D is incorrect: It conditions liability on active assistance during the offence, but the passage states that mere sharing of the unlawful object and membership at the time of the offence suffices to render all members guilty under constructive liability.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach (4–5 lines)

The passage defines unlawful assembly as a gathering of five or more persons sharing a prohibited common objective (e.g., use or threat of force against the state, resisting law, committing offences, depriving rights) and explains that an initially lawful gathering becomes unlawful if its object shifts to such purposes. It emphasizes that instigators and facilitators incur membership liability even without physical presence, and under constructive liability all members are equally guilty for offences committed in furtherance of the group’s common unlawful object, including rioting when force is used. When reading, the test taker should note the number threshold, prohibited objectives, the possibility of objective-shift, and the expansive scope of membership and collective liability. Focus on cue

phrases like “gathering of five or more,” “common object,” “hiring or encouraging,” “offence committed in furtherance,” and “force triggers rioting” to map scenarios to the principles.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches (1–3 lines each, with references to question specifics and passage lines)

- **Question 79 (Shift from lawful petition to threats and vandalism):** Recognize that the group began lawfully but its object changed to threatening property damage (line 4). Since P supported that shift, P becomes member of unlawful assembly, and vandalism committed in furtherance triggers constructive liability for all members (line 6).
- **Question 80 (Remote instigation via hiring and encouragement):** Note that X hired and encouraged others to join with the prohibited object of resisting execution of policy; physical presence is not required because “anyone who hires or encourages” is treated as member (line 5). Apply instigator liability.
- **Question 81 (Protesters decide to trespass and assault occurs):** Identify that initial lawful protest changed to unlawful trespass (resisting execution of law) (line 3), and the officer’s assault occurred in furtherance of that new common object. Even those who did not assault are liable under constructive liability (line 6).
- **Question 82 (Peaceful protest turns violent):** Establish that the assembly’s object to resist a law was unlawful; when one member uses violence or damages property, rioting liability attaches to all members present at that time (line 7). Note collective violence principle.
- **Question 83 (Group of four blocking access):** Check the numeric threshold: unlawful assembly requires five or more persons (line 1). With only four, this cannot qualify as unlawful assembly under the statute, regardless of intent to deprive rights.
- **Question 84 (Passage-based on constructive liability):** Recall that constructive liability holds every member equally guilty of offences committed in furtherance of the common unlawful object, regardless of personal participation (line 6). Focus on “regardless of personal participation” to choose the correct statement.

3) All Legal Principles Mentioned in the Passage (in Pointers)

- **Definition of Unlawful Assembly:** A gathering of five or more persons sharing a common objective within prohibited categories (use or threat of force against government/servants, resisting execution of law, committing offences, depriving legal rights, or compelling actions against law) (line 1–3).
- **Shift in Common Object:** An assembly that begins lawfully may become unlawful if its common object changes to one falling within prohibited categories (line 4).
- **Prohibited Objectives Enumerated:** Use or threat of criminal force against government, legislature, or public servants; resisting execution of law; committing

mischievous, criminal trespass, or any offence; depriving persons of legal rights; compelling actions against law or preventing exercise of rights (line 2–3).

- **Instigator/Facilitator Liability:** Anyone who hires, engages, promotes, or encourages others to join an unlawful assembly is punishable as though they were a member, even without physical presence (line 5).
- **Constructive Liability Principle:** If an offence is committed by any member in furtherance of the group's common unlawful object, every person who was a member at that time is held equally guilty of that offence, regardless of whether they personally took part (line 6).
- **Rioting Liability:** If any member uses force or violence to pursue the group's unlawful objective, all members are guilty of rioting, reflecting the collective nature of violent disturbance (line 7).
- **Collective Criminality as Deterrent:** The framework ensures that both active participants and instigators/facilitators are held liable, deterring unlawful group behaviour and promoting public order (line 9–10).
- **Number Threshold Requirement:** Unlawful assembly requires at least five persons; gatherings below this threshold do not qualify even if intent is unlawful (line 1).
- **Objective-based Liability Trigger:** Liability depends on the shared common object; initial lawful gathering becomes unlawful only upon agreed shift to prohibited objective (line 4).
- **No Need for Personal Participation in the Offence:** Liability attaches equally to all members present when the offence occurs, regardless of who physically commits it (line 6).
- **Broad Scope of Membership:** Membership extends to those who facilitate or encourage the assembly's unlawful object, not confined to physical attendees (line 5).
- **Group Accountability for Violence:** Use of force by any member transforms the offence into rioting, implicating the whole assembly (line 7).
- **Maintenance of Public Peace:** The principles aim to prevent group-based criminal conduct and uphold public law and order by ensuring wide liability (line 9–10).
- **Temporal Aspect of Liability:** Only those who are members at the time the common object has become unlawful and the offence is committed incur liability (line 4, line 6).

LOGICAL REASONING

Passage 15:

85. Answer: A

Explanation: This statement provides a concrete example—an Assam school teacher currently embroiled in a Supreme Court citizenship case—showing that individuals with legal proceedings underway have nonetheless been targeted by immigration operations. By citing this instance, the author grounds the general claim (“authorities... bypass due process”) in a specific empirical scenario.

- **Why B is incorrect:** Although it contextualizes border complexity, it doesn’t illustrate authorities ignoring legal processes.
- **Why C is incorrect:** It describes the Tribunal’s policy effect but does not show an instance of due-process bypass.
- **Why D is incorrect:** Sarma’s rhetoric is about communal framing, not about ignoring court orders or due process.

86. Answer: C

Explanation: The author’s discussion of needing to keep security measures separate from “polarising politics” and references to Sarma’s “dog whistles” imply that political actors could exploit security concerns to advance communal narratives. This inference aligns with the warning that the political exploitation of security contexts can stoke communal agendas.

- **Why A is incorrect:** The author does not equate increased surveillance with an inherent threat to democracy.
- **Why B is incorrect:** The passage suggests scepticism about purely security-based motives, indicating that drives are not always solely for national security.
- **Why D is incorrect:** The author does not claim that every reference to illegal immigration is communal bigotry; the critique is more nuanced.

87. Answer: D

Explanation: The entire passage emphasizes that while strengthening security after a terrorist attack is justified, it should not come at the cost of citizens’ legal rights or due process. This conclusion directly follows from the argument that due process is being undermined by rushed anti-immigration drives.

- **Why A is incorrect:** There’s no argument about the cut-off date’s legality; the focus is on its application.
- **Why B is incorrect:** The author warns against blanket deportations without due process.

- **Why C is incorrect:** The passage suggests the Tribunal's use has caused uncertainty and unfairness, not guaranteed fairness.

88. Answer: B

Explanation: To argue that politics must be kept separate from counter-terror measures, the author assumes that when political polarization occurs, it conflicts with or threatens due process. Without this assumption, the warning loses force, since politics and due process would be viewed as unrelated.

- **Why A is incorrect:** The author doesn't assert a direct causal link between polarization and terrorism.
- **Why C is incorrect:** The author is concerned with enforcement, not the constitutionality of the Home Ministry orders themselves.
- **Why D is incorrect:** The statement is about politics' impact on due process, not about the efficacy of surveillance.

89. Answer: A

Explanation: Evidence that people with valid citizenship documents are detained without formal charges is direct proof that authorities are ignoring legal procedures. This fact greatly strengthens the author's warning about due-process violations in anti-immigrant operations.

- **Why B is incorrect:** This scenario suggests judicial acquiescence, not executive bypass. The concern is about authorities ignoring the courts, not courts deferring.
- **Why C is incorrect:** Humanitarian protests are not direct evidence of due-process violations by authorities.
- **Why D is incorrect:** Potential financial incentives suggest motive but do not confirm actual procedural violations.

90. Answer: C

Explanation: A high court ruling explicitly stating that official directives contained no communal references directly contradicts the claim that the government framed immigration narratives in communal terms. That authoritative finding undermines the author's assertion about communal framing.

- **Why A is incorrect:** Neutral registration requirements don't negate the possibility of communal rhetoric in public discourse.
- **Why B is incorrect:** Observer reports are less authoritative and may overlook deeper nuances; a court ruling is more conclusive.
- **Why D is incorrect:** Opposition demands for stricter action don't address whether the government's language was communal or not—they reflect political disagreement over policy stringency.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach (4–5 lines) The passage acknowledges the necessity of stronger security after a terrorist attack but cautions that anti-immigration drives have at times bypassed judicial processes, especially in sensitive regions like Assam where political rhetoric stokes communal anxieties. It contrasts legitimate security imperatives with instances of extra-legal action (e.g., targeting individuals with pending court cases). When reading, focus on distinguishing descriptive premises (what has happened: heightened operations, cited examples) from the author’s normative concern (due process must not be sacrificed to politics), and note cue phrases that ground each question—specific examples, implied warnings, and cautious recommendations.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches (1–3 lines each)

- **Question 85 (Which sentence serves as factual premise for bypassing due process?):** *Approach:* Identify the concrete instance where due process is demonstrably ignored—the mention of the Assam school teacher with a pending Supreme Court case. This grounds the author’s claim in a real example.
- **Question 86 (Inference about security measures vs. polarization):** *Approach:* Observe how the author warns that politics (“dog whistles,” communal framing) can exploit security measures. Infer that the author sees potential for political actors to use security imperatives to further communal agendas.
- **Question 87 (Conclusion following from overall argument):** *Approach:* Look for the statement that aligns with the central normative thrust: security urgency should not trump legal rights or due process. Eliminate extremes or unrelated policy prescriptions.
- **Question 88 (Hidden assumption behind separating politics from security):** *Approach:* Determine what must be assumed for the warning to make sense: that political polarization can conflict with or undermine due process, so keeping them apart protects rights.
- **Question 89 (Which fact would strengthen the argument that operations risk bypassing procedures?):** *Approach:* Seek direct evidence of legal-procedure violations (e.g., detaining valid citizens without charges). That concretely underpins concerns about due-process bypass.
- **Question 90 (Which fact would weaken the claim of communal framing?):** *Approach:* Find the most authoritative refutation of communal rhetoric (e.g., a high court ruling noting no religious reference in directives). That directly undermines the assertion of communal framing.

3) Brief on Premises, Inferences, Conclusions, Arguments, Assumptions, and Paradoxes

- **Premises:** The government has heightened security and ordered intensified deportation of suspected illegal immigrants; specific examples show some actions

bypass ongoing court processes (e.g., Assam teacher with pending case; woman briefly pushed across border). Assam’s political discourse uses communal framing and Foreigner Tribunal processes that place heavy burden on individuals.

- **Inferences:** From these premises, the author infers that while security responses are justified, certain operations reflect politicized or extra-legal zeal that undermines rule of law. The historical sensitivity of cross-border movement in the Northeast makes heavy-handed drives especially fraught.
- **Conclusions:** The central conclusion is that counter-terrorism or immigration enforcement urgency must not override citizens’ legal rights or due process, and politics should be kept scrupulously separate from security measures.
- **Arguments:** The author first acknowledges the legitimacy of heightened security (descriptive + approval), then presents illustrative evidence of due-process bypass (specific cases), and argues normatively that such shortcuts are unacceptable. There is a contrast between necessary measures and wrongful practices.
- **Assumptions:** Implicitly assumes that ignoring judicial processes harms fundamental rights and public confidence; that political rhetoric can subvert fair enforcement; and that courts provide necessary checks even amid security concerns. Also assumes that procedural safeguards remain vital under urgency.
- **Paradoxes/Tensions:** There is a tension between urgency for security (which might tempt authorities to act swiftly, even extra-legally) and the imperative to uphold due process (which can be slower). Another tension lies in addressing genuine security threats without fueling communal polarization or unfairly targeting vulnerable groups. Competitive-exam style reasoning recognizes these as paradoxical pressures—security vs. rights, speed vs. fairness—and tests the ability to balance them logically.

Passage 16:

91. Answer: A

Explanation: The author’s claim that “the ticking biological clock is no longer the issue it was” relies on concrete examples showing why women no longer must settle under biological pressures. Sentence A—“The option of freezing eggs, using sperm donors, and the acceptance of single parenthood means women no longer need to settle”—directly lists advancements (medical and social) that reduce the urgency to marry early. Thus, it is the factual premise underpinning the author’s broader conclusion.

- Why B is incorrect: While B acknowledges a shift in how single women are socially viewed, it speaks generally about societal positioning, not specifically about biological clock issues or technological options like egg freezing.

- Why C is incorrect: This option discusses social media and comparison culture, which is unrelated to biological clock or reproductive choices. It cannot serve as a premise for the clock argument.
- Why D is incorrect: Although D shows Bridget's realization about Mr. Right, it does not address reproductive technology or social acceptance of single parenthood; it instead focuses on romantic fulfillment rather than the biological clock.

92. Answer: D

Explanation: Throughout the passage, the author states that “the old-fashioned point of view is that the surfeit of choices available suits men more than women,” but then immediately qualifies this, arguing that many women do not necessarily seek long-term relationships. The author emphasizes that dating apps have “been enormously liberating,” signaling a positive stance. One can infer that the author perceives these apps as empowering tools that liberate women from the pressure to settle.

- Why A is incorrect: The passage never suggests dating apps exacerbate loneliness or superficiality as an inherent trait; the author's tone is broadly favorable toward them.
- Why B is incorrect: Rejecting dating apps' influence contradicts the author's explicit statement that they have “been enormously liberating,” indicating significant impact.
- Why C is incorrect: There is no suggestion of “reckless romantic behavior” or moral hazard; the author focuses on autonomy and choice rather than reckless conduct.

93. Answer: B

Explanation: The passage contrasts the 2001 cultural moment—when a career woman in her 30s was assumed to need a husband and baby—with today's context, where “women have their own apartments, cars and friends, they don't have to also have a permanent man to enjoy life.” Therefore, concluding that the narrative of a hapless career woman desperately seeking marriage is now anachronistic (B) follows directly from the author's argument about shifting social norms and women's autonomy.

- Why A is incorrect: Nothing in the passage indicates an absolute commercial failure; rather, the author says the premise would feel outdated, not that no one would relate.
- Why C is incorrect: The author implies that single women today face less societal pressure, not more, due to liberalization of reproductive choices and social acceptance, so C contradicts the passage.
- Why D is incorrect: The author specifically notes that women's romantic anxieties have evolved (e.g., they no longer see the clock ticking), so claiming the comedic premise is unchanged misreads the argument.

94. Answer: C

Explanation: When the author asserts that presuming all women seek long-term relationships is part of an “old-fashioned point of view,” the unstated assumption is that that stereotype—that women’s primary aim is to find a spouse—still undergirds societal expectations. Option C identifies this very assumption: that the stereotype about women’s primary aim underlies the author’s critique. Only by assuming that society expects marriage above all can the author argue that this presumption is erroneous.

- Why A is incorrect: The author does not discuss time management or scrolling habits as relevant; the focus is on relationship goals, not spare time.
- Why B is incorrect: This option falsely posits that the author believes women are incapable of commitment; there is no suggestion of innate incapacity, merely a critique of societal assumptions.
- Why D is incorrect: The author does not argue that algorithms are gender-biased; the discussion is about assumptions regarding women’s relationship goals, not technical bias in apps.

95. Answer: B

Explanation: The author’s statement that “dating apps have been enormously liberating” hinges on how apps expand choices beyond traditional matchmaking. Option B—“Surveys indicate that a significant proportion of single women now use apps to secure casual companionship or networking without any expectation of marriage, a departure from earlier norms”—directly confirms that many women use apps for purposes other than long-term commitment, illustrating true liberation from prior constraints. It shows women are no longer compelled to seek marriage first, thus strengthening the author’s argument.

- Why A is incorrect: If 70% feel pressure to settle quickly, it suggests apps do not liberate but reinforce anxiety, which would actually weaken the claim rather than strengthen it.
- Why C is incorrect: While ghosting is a negative phenomenon, it does not contradict or reinforce the idea of liberation; it only highlights a flaw.
- Why D is incorrect: Interview evidence about “quality of connections” not improving emotional well-being does not address women’s agency or choice. It focuses on outcomes rather than expanded autonomy.

96. Answer: A

Explanation: The author criticizes the presumption that “all women are seeking long-term relationships.” Option A states that “a growing segment of women actively use dating apps to form non-monogamous or short-term arrangements, indicating that not all women seek long-term relationships.” This fact directly undermines any assumption that women uniformly want marriage, thereby weakening the author’s statement that the presumption is

erroneous. Actually, it shows that the presumption was never universally held, so the critique loses force.

- Why B is incorrect: A finding that men face more pressure to commit does not directly address women's preferences; it shifts focus to men rather than showing that some women reject long-term relationships.
- Why C is incorrect: Commentary about reducing men's pickiness does not speak to whether women seek long-term relationships; it addresses male behavior, not women's goals.
- Why D is incorrect: If 80% of single women do seek marriage, that supports rather than undermines the presumption that women mainly pursue long-term commitments, thus strengthening the author's claim instead of weakening it.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach (4–5 lines)

The passage reflects on how the cultural expectations embodied in *Bridget Jones's Diary*—that a single career woman in her 30s urgently needs a husband and baby—have shifted: today, women enjoy greater autonomy, reproductive technologies, and social acceptance of varied life choices. It contrasts the early 2000s rom-com milieu with current realities—dating apps, single parenthood options, reduced stigma—and underscores how these changes render the original premise dated. When reading, focus on identifying the author's contrast between past norms and present freedoms, noting concrete examples (egg freezing, apps) that support her argument, and distinguishing descriptive references to Bridget Jones films from normative claims about women's autonomy.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches (1–3 lines each, with references to question specifics)

- **Question 91 (Factual premise for “ticking biological clock is no longer the issue”):** *Approach:* Find the sentence that directly mentions reproductive options mitigating the clock—“The option of freezing eggs, using sperm donors, and the acceptance of single parenthood...”; this grounds the clock argument.
- **Question 92 (Inference on author's attitude toward dating apps):** *Approach:* Note the explicit phrase “dating apps have been enormously liberating” and how the author qualifies surfeit-of-choices assumptions; infer a positive, empowering view for women's autonomy.
- **Question 93 (Conclusion from portrayal differences):** *Approach:* Identify which conclusion aligns with the passage's point that a narrative of a hapless single woman desperately seeking marriage feels outdated today; choose the option reflecting anachronism of that premise.
- **Question 94 (Assumption underlying critique of presuming all women seek long-term relationships):** *Approach:* Determine the unstated belief that societal stereotypes position women's

primary aim as marriage; select the option capturing that underlying stereotype about women's goals.

- **Question 95 (Strengthening “dating apps have been enormously liberating”):**
Approach: Look for evidence showing women use apps for non-marriage-focused purposes—casual companionship or networking—demonstrating expanded choice beyond settling.
- **Question 96 (Weakening assertion about presumption of women seeking long-term relationships):**
Approach: Find the fact that directly contradicts the presumption by showing many women actively choose short-term or non-monogamous arrangements, undermining the generalization.

3) Brief on Premises, Inferences, Conclusions, Arguments, Assumptions, and Paradoxes

- **Premises:** The original *Bridget Jones's Diary* reflected a time when social norms pressed 30-something women toward marriage and motherhood; successive films mirror changing contexts. Today, women have apartments, careers, social networks, reproductive technologies (egg freezing, sperm donors), and social acceptance of single parenthood; dating apps offer choice.
- **Inferences:** From these premises, the author infers that earlier narratives of desperation are outdated, reproductive concerns are less urgent, and women need not “settle.” She also infers that assumptions about women's uniform desire for long-term relationships are unfounded.
- **Conclusions:** The passage concludes that a story premised on a single woman's urgency for marriage would feel anachronistic today; modern contexts afford autonomy, varied choices, and diminished stigma.
- **Arguments:** The author juxtaposes past and present: describing Bridget Jones's cultural moment, then cataloguing shifts (social media absence, reproductive tech, dating apps, changed social positioning). She uses examples from movies and social trends to argue for women's increased freedom.
- **Assumptions:** It is assumed that access to reproductive technologies effectively mitigates biological-timing pressures; that dating apps truly expand meaningful options; that social acceptance of single parenthood reduces stigma. It also assumes that women value autonomy and diverse relationship forms.
- **Paradoxes/Tensions:** There is a tension between celebrating expanded autonomy and acknowledging new challenges (e.g., social media comparison, choice overload), though the author emphasizes net positives. Another tension lies in recognizing freedom to choose while some may still feel societal pressure. Competitive-exam reasoning requires weighing these contrasts without overgeneralizing, focusing on textual support for each inference.

Passage 17:

97. Answer: B

Explanation: Statement B directly reveals that the 7.4% Q4 growth was inflated by a 12.7% surge in net tax collections, and without that boost, real economic expansion would have been only 6.8%. This provides the concrete factual basis (or premise) for saying that reported GDP growth was bolstered by tax statistics rather than purely by underlying productive activity. In other words, it shows that excluding the tax bump, the economy grew less robustly, thereby substantiating the author's claim about a statistical boost.

- Why A is incorrect: "Services... continued their steady and strong growth" tells us one sector performed well, but it does not isolate or reveal how much of the aggregate growth figure was driven by taxes versus actual sectoral output. It doesn't speak to the discrepancy between reported and underlying activity.
- Why C is incorrect: The statement about the "Maha Kumbh effect" on consumption simply addresses private consumption weakness (6% growth), which is relevant to demand but not to the question of how much GDP growth was artificially inflated by taxes. It does not directly quantify the net-tax effect on overall numbers.
- Why D is incorrect: The Viksit Bharat target of sustained 8% growth by 2047 is aspirational and forward-looking, but it does not serve as a factual premise about how current growth was calculated. It has nothing to do with the immediate statistical distortion from net-tax collections.

98. Answer: D

Explanation: The author explicitly criticizes the government's pride over 6.5% annual growth by pointing out that, although it is the fastest among major economies, that comparison does not address India's deeper imperatives—job creation, infrastructure needs, poverty reduction, etc. Hence, the logical inference is that focusing on relative performance versus other nations misses the point; the real benchmark must be domestic requirements. That inference (D) encapsulates the author's view that relative ranking is a hollow metric if India's own goals remain unmet.

- Why A is incorrect: The passage does mention manufacturing underperforming (4.8% vs. prior 11.3%), but it never asserts that this slowdown poses an existential threat; it simply notes it is a lagging sector. The author's principal critique is not limited to manufacturing risk.
- Why B is incorrect: While the "Maha Kumbh effect" may not have materialised, the author does not suggest that it will reverse or render short-term gains moot; rather, the author uses it to show that an anticipated consumption boost did not happen. Inferring a future reversal goes beyond the text.

- Why C is incorrect: The author does point to construction and agriculture as recent drivers, but nowhere does the text explicitly say these sectors cannot be relied upon for sustained growth—only that manufacturing is weak and that 7.4% was set off by net taxes. It does not rule out their future importance.

99. Answer: C

Explanation: The author’s overarching message is that 6.5% growth—though relatively high compared to other countries—is insufficient for India’s own developmental goals. He reminds us that to achieve “Viksit Bharat by 2047,” India needs sustained 8% growth. Therefore, the conclusion that flows naturally is that India must aim for at least 8% annual growth if it is serious about its long-term aspirations (C). The author ties these aspirational targets directly to the need for higher growth.

- Why A is incorrect: Although the government touts 6.5% as the fastest among major economies, the author argues that this comparative achievement is inadequate. Thus, saying “there is no urgent need for recalibration” misreads the passage’s insistence that “not bad” is insufficient.
- Why B is incorrect: While services and agriculture did perform strongly, the passage never suggests that manufacturing can be deprioritised. In fact, the author laments manufacturing’s slowdown and highlights a need for overall acceleration.
- Why D is incorrect: The statement about net taxes provides context for why 7.4% may overstate underlying activity, but it does not suggest that macroeconomic stability should replace productive activity. The author’s key emphasis is on real growth, not suggesting that tax collections are more important than productive expansion.

100. Answer: B

Explanation: For the author to claim that “not bad” is insufficient because India must meet its own growing requirements (jobs, infrastructure, poverty reduction, etc.), one must assume that India’s domestic needs indeed demand growth well above 6.5%. Otherwise, if domestic requirements could be met at 6.5%, then the author’s criticism collapses. Thus, assumption B—that India’s domestic needs require growth significantly higher than 6.5%—underlies and enables the contention.

- Why A is incorrect: The author does not claim that outperforming neighbors automatically raises living standards. The focus is on absolute domestic targets, not relative neighbor comparisons.
- Why C is incorrect: There is no indication that the author believes 6.5% is “unsustainable” because of global volatility. The argument centers on adequacy, not sustainability.
- Why D is incorrect: If the government’s “Viksit Bharat” rhetoric were purely symbolic, the author would not treat it as a serious benchmark. The author explicitly uses that

target to criticize current growth, so he assumes the rhetoric is meaningful rather than hollow.

101. Answer: A

Explanation: Observation (i) states that Q4 registered an unexpectedly strong 7.4% expansion—the fastest quarter in an otherwise weak year—while (ii) notes that the full-year 6.5% growth is a four-year low. At first glance, a quarter growing at 7.4% should pull up the annual average, so how can the final yearly figure still be low? This indicates that other quarters must have been considerably weaker, thus producing a low annual average despite one strong quarter. That tension (paradox) is captured by choice A: If Q4’s performance was so robust, how could the full year still come in at 6.5%? The answer is that earlier quarters must have underperformed.

- Why B is incorrect: This option conflates capital formation with annual growth. The passage does say capital formation rose 9.4%, but the paradox lies in reconciling a strong single quarter with a four-year low annual result, not in how capital investments relate to overall satisfaction.
- Why C is incorrect: The author does not call the entire financial year “disastrous.” He calls the year “dismal” relative to expectations, but that term does not imply zero quarters of good performance. Therefore, it is not inexplicable for one quarter to outperform in a generally weak year.
- Why D is incorrect: Government satisfaction about 6.5% growth does not directly conflict with strong sector performance. Even if services, agriculture, and construction grew well, manufacturing and other quarters may have been weak, so 6.5% could still be deemed “slow.” Hence, this choice does not identify the genuine paradox.

102. Answer: C

Explanation: The author argues that India’s 6.5% growth, while relatively strong internationally, is insufficient to meet the long-term Viksit Bharat goals requiring roughly 8% growth. Choice C states that if India continues at 6.5%, its per capita GDP in 2047 will fall 20% short of what is needed for those development targets. This directly bolsters the author’s contention by quantifying the shortfall and showing that persisting at current growth rates will derail aspirational outcomes, making the argument for targeting closer to 8% all the more urgent.

- Why A is incorrect: While demonstrating that no country raised its per capita income without 7.5% growth is persuasive, it does not directly tie to India’s specific 2047 targets. It references international precedent rather than the government’s own stated goals.

- Why B is incorrect: If economists believe that growth above 7% will cause intolerable inflation, that actually undermines (weakens) the author's argument for aiming at 8%, since an inflationary constraint would argue against higher targets.
- Why D is incorrect: Credit rating improvements are important for borrowing costs, but they do not directly connect to the Viksit Bharat development imperatives. Even if growth above 8% fosters better creditworthiness, the author's key argument is about meeting domestic socio-economic needs, not about rating considerations.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach (4–5 lines)

The passage analyses India's 2024–25 economic data, noting a surprisingly strong Q4 growth driven partly by a tax-collection "bump" but a modest 6.5% annual growth that falls short of the ~8% needed for the 'Viksit Bharat 2047' aspiration. It contrasts sectoral performances—robust construction and agriculture versus lagging manufacturing—and questions whether "stable" but unspectacular growth is adequate for India's own developmental needs rather than global rankings. When reading, focus on distinguishing concrete data points (e.g., Q4 7.4% vs. annual 6.5%, tax boost effect) from the author's normative stance (need for higher growth), and note recurring themes: statistical vs. real activity, domestic imperatives vs. relative performance.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches (1–3 lines each)

- **Question 97 (Factual premise about tax boost lowering real growth):** *Approach:* Identify which sentence explicitly quantifies how much of the 7.4% Q4 growth came from net taxes ("bump" versus underlying activity). Look for the direct statement giving the 12.7% tax increase and recalculated 6.8% real growth.
- **Question 98 (Inference about pride in relative ranking):** *Approach:* Note the author's reaction to officials lauding 6.5% as "fastest among major economies" and infer that the author thinks this comparison misses India's unique domestic targets. Choose the inference reflecting that emphasis on relative ranking overlooks internal needs.
- **Question 99 (Conclusion from overall argument on 6.5% vs. 8% target):** *Approach:* Pinpoint the author's call that 6.5% is insufficient for 'Viksit Bharat' requiring sustained ~8%. Select the conclusion that India must aim for ~8% growth to meet its long-term goals.
- **Question 100 (Assumption underlying "not bad" is not good enough):** *Approach:* Determine what must be assumed for the critique to hold: namely, that India's domestic requirements (jobs, infrastructure, poverty alleviation) cannot be met at only 6.5%, implying need for significantly higher growth.
- **Question 101 (Identifying the paradox between Q4 strength and annual low growth):**
Approach: Recognize the tension: a 7.4% Q4 should boost the annual average, yet

the year registers only 6.5%, implying other quarters were weak. Choose the option that highlights this apparent contradiction.

- **Question 102 (Strengthening need to exceed 6.5% toward 8% for 2047 goals):**
Approach: Look for a fact that quantifies the shortfall if India stays at 6.5%, showing that per capita targets for 2047 would not be met—directly underlining the argument for higher sustained growth.

3) Brief on Premises, Inferences, Conclusions, Arguments, Assumptions, and Paradoxes

- **Premises:** GDP data show Q4 growth of 7.4%—boosted by a 12.7% rise in net taxes—while full-year growth is 6.5%, the slowest since the pandemic; sectoral breakdown reveals strong construction and agriculture but weak manufacturing; consumption uplift from events (e.g., “Maha Kumbh”) was muted; capital formation improved. Officials tout 6.5% as fastest globally. The government aspires to ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ requiring ~8% sustained growth.
- **Inferences:** The statistical boost from taxes masks underlying slower activity (~6.8% in Q4 absent tax bump); celebrated relative performance glosses over domestic shortfalls; stable growth implies limited upside, raising concerns for a transitioning economy.
- **Conclusions:** India needs to pursue higher growth (~8% annually) to meet its evolving developmental needs and long-term aspirations; mere stability or global ranking is insufficient.
- **Arguments:** The author juxtaposes optimistic data (strong Q4, sectoral gains) with disappointing annual figures and structural weaknesses (manufacturing slowdown, muted consumption), arguing that headline growth must be judged against internal requirements, not only against other countries. Aspirational targets necessitate rethinking policy to accelerate growth beyond current levels.
- **Assumptions:** Meeting India’s developmental targets (jobs, infrastructure, poverty reduction, rising living standards) demands growth above 6.5%; tax-driven statistical gains do not substitute for real expansion; sectoral strengths alone cannot guarantee overall acceleration without addressing lagging areas; aspirational goals are meaningful benchmarks, not mere rhetoric.
- **Paradoxes/Tensions:** A robust single-quarter performance coexisting with a weak annual average highlights uneven growth cycles; celebrating relative global standing conflicts with the imperative for higher absolute growth; stability may lessen volatility risk but also suggests limited potential for acceleration. Competitive-exam reasoning involves isolating these tensions, evaluating data versus normative benchmarks, distinguishing descriptive statistics from policy prescriptions, and testing underlying assumptions to arrive at supported inferences and conclusions.

Passage 18:

103. Answer: C

Explanation: Statement C explicitly states that research in Scotland “suggests – though it does not definitively prove – that the introduction of minimum unit pricing has led to fewer deaths and hospitalisations.” This sentence provides the concrete evidence linking Scotland’s pricing reform to a reduction in alcohol-related harm. Because the author desires to show that minimum unit pricing can be effective, C functions as the factual premise: it reports actual observed outcomes (fewer deaths and hospitalisations) directly tied to the policy.

- Why A is incorrect: While the record-high death toll (10,473) for the UK in 2023 is a relevant statistic about the scale of the problem, it does not specify any link to minimum unit pricing’s impact. It only illustrates the severity of alcohol-related mortality, not the specific effects of pricing policy.
- Why B is incorrect: Lord Darzi’s observation about England’s rising deaths coinciding with increasing affordability points to a correlation in England, but does not serve as direct evidence regarding Scotland’s minimum unit pricing. It explains why affordability matters but does not show the outcome of Scotland’s policy, which is what the question asks.
- Why D is incorrect: The founding of a European Health Alliance on Alcohol might indicate growing international concern, yet it does not supply direct evidence that Scotland’s minimum unit pricing reduced deaths or hospitalisations. It speaks to advocacy efforts, not empirical outcomes.

104. Answer: B

Explanation: The author points out that research in Scotland suggests (even if not conclusively) that minimum unit pricing has reduced alcohol-related harms, and mentions international recommendations (WHO, EU alliance). Having this body of evidence and global pressure makes England’s refusal inconsistent with a genuine prevention focus. Therefore, B correctly infers that the author thinks the decision needs reconsideration because it clashes with evidence and international momentum toward evidence-backed prevention.

- Why A is incorrect: There is no direct statement or implication that Labour made its decision based explicitly on conflict with its economic-growth agenda. While the author criticizes Labour for listening to business, the inference asked for is specifically about why the author believes the minimum-pricing decision merits review. A is too narrow and assumes motivation without textual support.
- Why C is incorrect: The passage does not provide or imply any quantitative health-economic trade-off analysis that Labour conducted. There is no mention that Labour chose policy based on calculations of revenue versus health.

- Why D is incorrect: The author nowhere suggests that policies adopted in Wales must automatically carry over to England. While the contrast is noted, the key point is that evidence supports pricing reform and would fit a prevention framework. Automatically adopting Welsh measures is not stated or implied.

105. Answer: D

Explanation: The author lays out a chain of reasoning: Labour claims it will shift NHS focus from treatment to prevention. International evidence (WHO, EU alliance) and Scottish data suggest minimum unit pricing is an effective preventive measure. Yet Labour in England has ruled it out. If prevention is genuinely being prioritized, Labour must revisit its stance on minimum pricing (and potentially other interventions). Thus, D summarizes the conclusion: to align rhetoric with evidence, Labour must reconsider pricing.

- Why A is incorrect: Although WHO and European alliances are campaigning, the author does not argue for wholesale adoption of all European measures “immediately.” The conclusion is specifically about minimum unit pricing as part of prevention, not about rigidly adopting every foreign policy.
- Why B is incorrect: The passage does not claim that obesity’s primacy implies alcohol should be deprioritised. In fact, the author states alcohol will feature prominently in sections of the plan, so B is directly opposite to the author’s thrust.
- Why C is incorrect: While the author acknowledges the government’s economic growth priorities, he does not conclude that these priorities justify maintaining the status quo on alcohol regulation. Rather, he contends the economic-growth stance is precisely why Labour must overcome business pressure and embrace evidence-based prevention measures.

106. Answer: A

Explanation: The author remarks that a government staking its reputation on economic growth “is a good listener to businesses.” Implicit is the assumption that the government will be reluctant to enact regulations businesses strongly oppose, because doing so could harm growth or provoke business backlash. If one accepts A—that the government is unwilling to jeopardize economic growth by enacting regulations that businesses strongly oppose—then it follows naturally why Labour would refrain from reversing food-industry concessions or adopting minimum unit pricing. Hence, A underlies the author’s observation.

- Why B is incorrect: The statement that public health measures have no measurable business impact is not needed to justify the author’s contention. The author specifically suggests the opposite: that business lobbying succeeded in watering down restrictions because the government cares about growth. B asserts a universal non-impact, which conflicts with the point that businesses influence policy.
- Why C is incorrect: The author does not claim that only growth-focused governments can balance health and industry issues; that is too sweeping. He simply observes that

this growth-focused government listens to businesses. C extrapolates too far, positing an exclusivity not present in the text.

- Why D is incorrect: While the author links economic growth commitments to business friendliness, he does not assert that such a commitment automatically implies hostility to all public health interventions. D is too broad; the passage concedes that certain public health measures do survive (e.g., guidelines), even if they are watered down, so hostility is not universal.

107. Answer: C

Explanation: Observation (i) notes that Labour introduced minimum unit pricing in Wales, while observation (ii) states that Labour has not reversed the previous administration's diluted restrictions on ultra-processed foods. The paradox is that, on one hand, Labour has shown itself willing to legislate a potentially unpopular public health measure (minimum pricing) in Wales, yet, on the other, it refuses to reinstate stricter food guidelines in England even though it campaigned on a prevention agenda. In other words, if Labour is committed to public health prevention, why selectively apply it (Wales) but ignore it (England)? That inconsistent approach to two analogous prevention initiatives is captured in C.

- Why A is incorrect: While A touches on a similar theme, it singles out public health value as the criterion. The real tension is not only that Labour values public health in Wales but is neglecting it elsewhere; it is that Labour's approach to prevention is inconsistent across policy domains, not merely between regions. A oversimplifies the paradox by focusing on Wales versus food policy, rather than on the incoherent prevention strategy.
- Why B is incorrect: The existence of the European Health Alliance on Alcohol is separate and not directly tied to the paradox. The tension lies within Labour's own actions on two frontiers (alcohol pricing vs. food restrictions), not between domestic inaction and European advocacy.
- Why D is incorrect: The WHO statement about zero "safe amount" of alcohol is cited to support more robust alcohol regulation but does not generate the paradox described. The real contradiction is that, despite some proactive steps in Wales, Labour fails to reverse weakened food guidelines in England. D does not identify that specific inconsistency.

108. Answer: C

Explanation: The author contends that, since prevention is meant to be a guiding principle, Labour's refusal to adopt minimum unit pricing in England must be reconsidered. Polling data showing 72% of the English public supports pricing reform if it will reduce NHS burden—"even if prices rise moderately"—directly strengthens the author's argument. It demonstrates that a large majority of voters would back the measure, undermining any

political rationale for refusing it and bolstering the case that Labour should align policy with public opinion and prevention goals.

- Why A is incorrect: Although a peer-reviewed study showing a 15% drop in alcohol sales with no pub revenue decline in Wales is interesting, it speaks to economic impacts rather than public or political acceptability. It does not directly address Labour's need to reverse its stance, because the author's argument hinges on both health outcomes and voter support. A shows a favorable economic outcome, but Labour's refusal has more to do with perceived economic risk; voter support (C) cuts closer to the political rationale.
- Why B is incorrect: An industry-funded report claiming no significant effect in Scotland could weaken the case for pricing, not strengthen it. It introduces doubt about the effectiveness, running directly counter to the author's call for reconsideration.
- Why D is incorrect: A comparative static on per-capita consumption is useful, but the author's argument depends on more than consumption metrics; he stresses that minimum unit pricing can reduce hospitalisations and deaths. Merely showing consumption stayed static undermines rather than bolsters the moral and public-health case for the policy. Polling data reflecting public support (C) directly addresses the political need to reconsider the policy.

1) Brief Explanation of the Passage and Reading Approach (4–5 lines)

The passage discusses the forthcoming 10-year health plan in the UK, emphasizing a shift from treatment to prevention, with particular focus on alcohol alongside obesity. It notes rising alcohol-related harms, evidence from Scotland's minimum unit pricing, and international pressure for tougher policies, contrasted with political hesitation in England. When reading, the test taker should distinguish descriptive evidence (statistics on deaths, policy precedents in Scotland/Wales, WHO statements) from the author's normative stance (that prevention demands reconsidering minimum pricing) and note tensions between economic-growth priorities and public health measures.

2) Question-by-Question Approaches (1–3 lines each)

- **Question 103 (Factual basis for positive impact of Scotland's pricing):** *Approach:* Identify the sentence that directly links Scotland's minimum unit pricing to reduced harms—look for the explicit mention of research suggesting fewer deaths and hospitalisations.
- **Question 104 (Inference about why ruling out minimum pricing "should be" reviewed):**
Approach: Recognize that the author juxtaposes evidence of effectiveness (Scotland, WHO, EU alliance) with England's refusal; infer that this inconsistency undermines a genuine prevention narrative.

- **Question 105 (Conclusion from overall argument on 10-year plan and alcohol policy):**

Approach: Pinpoint the conclusion that aligns with the author's call: if prevention is genuine, policy stance (e.g., minimum pricing) must be revisited. Eliminate extremes or irrelevant prescriptions.

- **Question 106 (Assumption behind "government... good listener to businesses"):**

Approach: Determine what belief underlies the claim that a growth-focused government heeds business pressure—namely that it will avoid regulations businesses oppose to protect economic objectives.

- **Question 107 (Paradox between Wales pricing and unreversed food-policy concessions):**

Approach: Identify the inconsistency in Labour's selective prevention actions: it introduced pricing in Wales but did not reverse weakened food guidelines in England, reflecting an uneven approach to public health.

- **Question 108 (Strengthening argument to reconsider pricing):** *Approach:* Look for evidence that directly bolsters both the health case and political feasibility—especially public support data indicating voters back minimum pricing to reduce NHS burden.

3) Brief on Premises, Inferences, Conclusions, Arguments, Assumptions, and Paradoxes

- **Premises:** UK's health plan will emphasize prevention; alcohol-related deaths at record highs; evidence from Scotland suggests minimum unit pricing reduces harms; WHO and international bodies advocate zero safe alcohol; England's Labour government has ruled out such pricing despite evidence; business lobbying influences policy.
- **Inferences:** Rising harms and international consensus imply that minimum pricing is an evidence-backed prevention tool; political reluctance reflects business influence rather than public health need; inconsistent regional policies signal a gap between rhetoric and action.
- **Conclusions:** If prevention truly guides policy, England must reconsider minimum unit pricing (and related interventions) despite economic-growth concerns; aligning with evidence and public health imperatives is necessary.
- **Arguments:** The author contrasts robust evidence and international momentum for tougher alcohol measures with England's refusal, arguing this undermines genuine prevention. The piece highlights political pressures from industry and the need to prioritize health over business interests.
- **Assumptions:** Effective prevention policies (e.g., pricing) will meaningfully reduce harms; public opinion or evidence should outweigh business lobbying; comparing Scotland/Wales to England is valid; governments reluctant on pricing fear economic pushback.

- **Paradoxes/Tensions:** Tension between economic-growth priorities (listening to business) and health interventions; selective adoption of preventive measures in one region but not another; balancing political feasibility against urgent public health evidence. In competitive-exam terms, one must spot these contrasts, differentiate fact-based premises from normative judgments, uncover hidden assumptions about government motivations, and resolve apparent inconsistencies by aligning policy rationale with evidence.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Passage 19:

109 Answer: B. 240 days

Explanation:

1. Last month saw **1,200 rental-days** in total (line 2).
2. SUVs accounted for **20%** of all rentals (line 2).
3. Calculate SUV rental-days: 20% of 1,200 = $1,200 \times 0.20 = 240$ days.

Why other options are incorrect:

- **Option A (180):** Would correspond to 15% of 1,200, not the stated 20%.
- **Option C (300):** Is 25% of 1,200, not applicable.
- **Option D (360):** Equals 30% of 1,200, which matches Sedan's share (line 2), not SUV's.

110 Answer: A. ₹648,000

Explanation:

1. Sedans comprised **30%** of the 1,200 rental-days (line 2).
2. Number of Sedan days = $1,200 \times 0.30 = 360$ days.
3. Standard Sedan rate = **₹1,800 per day** (line 3).
4. Base-rate revenue = 360 days \times ₹1,800/day = $360 \times 1,800 = ₹648,000$.

Why other options are incorrect:

- **Option B (₹720,000):** Equals 400 days \times ₹1,800; no 400-day count.
- **Option C (₹540,000):** Would be $300 \times ₹1,800$, i.e. 25% of rentals, not 30%.
- **Option D (₹432,000):** Equals $240 \times ₹1,800$, the SUV days (line 2), not Sedan.

111 Answer: A. ₹2,000

Explanation:

1. SUV standard rate = **₹3,000/day** (line 3).

2. Under “rent two, get third free,” a customer pays only for 2 days but uses 3 days (line 4).
3. Effective daily rate = total paid ÷ days used = $(2 \times ₹3,000) \div 3 = ₹6,000 \div 3 = \mathbf{₹2,000}$.
4. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **Option B (₹1,500):** Would apply a 50% discount each day, not a “free third day.”
 - **Option C (₹2,500):** Implies paying 5/6 of full rate per day; no basis in the “2 for 3” deal.
 - **Option D (₹3,000):** Is the standard rate, ignoring the promotion.

112 Answer: A. ₹4,350

Explanation:

1. Economy standard rate = ₹1,200/day (line 3); Weekend discount = ₹100 off, so discounted rate = ₹1,100/day (line 4).
2. Fuel surcharge = ₹150/day (line 6).
3. GPS add-on = ₹200/day (line 6).
4. Total per day = $1,100 + 150 + 200 = ₹1,450$.
5. For 3 days: $3 \times ₹1,450 = \mathbf{₹4,350}$.
6. However, **non-corporate** means no 5% rebate (line 5), so full amount.
7. **Correct total = ₹4,350.**
8. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **Option B (₹4,650):** Too high—seems to use full ₹1,550/day (no weekend discount).
 - **Option C (₹4,050):** Too low—perhaps mistakenly omitted either surcharge or GPS.
 - **Option D (₹3,900):** Omits GPS or surcharge incorrectly.

113 Answer: A. ₹47,500

Explanation:

1. Corporate rebate = **5%** on monthly invoice after all discounts and surcharges (line 5).
2. Invoice before rebate = **₹50,000** (question stem).
3. Rebate amount = 5% of 50,000 = ₹2,500.
4. Final payment = $50,000 - 2,500 = \mathbf{₹47,500}$.
5. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **Option B (₹48,500):** Applies a 3% rebate, not 5%.
 - **Option C (₹45,000):** Implies 10% rebate instead of 5%.
 - **Option D (₹46,000):** Implies 8% rebate; no basis in passage.

114 Answer: B. 1 : 1

Explanation:

1. Economy rental-days = 50% of 1,200 = 600 days (line 2); SUV days = 20% of 1,200 = 240 days (line 2).
2. Base-rate revenue from Economy = $600 \times ₹1,200 = ₹720,000$.
3. Base-rate revenue from SUVs = $240 \times ₹3,000 = ₹720,000$.
4. Ratio = $₹720,000 : ₹720,000 = 1 : 1$.
5. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **Option A (1 : 2):** Would be 720k : 1.44m or vice versa; not supported.
 - **Option C (2 : 3):** No 2:3 split in those revenues.
 - **Option D (3 : 5):** No such ratio arises from 720k vs. 720k.

Passage Explanation & Reading Approach This passage outlines how CityRide’s 120-vehicle fleet generated 1,200 rental-days last month, split 50/30/20 across Economy, Sedan, and SUV classes with distinct daily rates (₹1,200/₹1,800/₹3,000). Weekend promotions (flat discount, percentage off, free day), fuel surcharges, GPS add-ons, and corporate rebates layer onto base pricing. Test-takers must first translate percentages into absolute rental-day counts, then apply per-day rates and promotions in sequence, minding the order: base rate → discount → surcharge/add-on → rebate. Organizing class-by-class tables for days, rates, and net per-day revenue clarifies multi-step arithmetic and ratio comparisons.

Question-by-Question Approaches

Question 109 (SUV rental-days):

Compute 20% of 1,200 total rental-days to get SUV days; basic “percentage of total” arithmetic.

Question 110 (Sedan base revenue):

Find Sedan days (30% of 1,200), multiply by the ₹1,800 daily rate; isolate base-rate revenue before any extras.

Question 111 (SUV effective rate):

Apply the “pay 2 days, use 3” deal: $(2 \times ₹3,000) \div 3$ to get per-day cost; ignore surcharges and add-ons.

Question 112 (Economy weekend cost):

For 3-day weekend: start with ₹1,200 base, subtract ₹100 discount, then add ₹150 fuel and ₹200 GPS per day; multiply by 3 days.

Question 113 (Corporate rebate):

Take pre-rebate invoice (₹50,000) and subtract 5% of that amount; straightforward “after rebate” calculation.

Question 114 (Economy vs SUV ratio):

Calculate total base revenue for each class (rental-days × base rate), then form and simplify the ratio.

Passage 20:

Question 115 Answer: B. ₹7,200

Explanation:

1. **Raised-bed total area:** Each bed = $8\text{ m} \times 5\text{ m} = 40\text{ m}^2$; 12 beds $\rightarrow 12 \times 40 = 480\text{ m}^2$ (line 2).
2. **Fertilizer rate:** ₹15 per m^2 per month (line 2).
3. **Total monthly cost:** $480\text{ m}^2 \times ₹15/\text{m}^2 = ₹7,200$.
4. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **₹6,000 (A):** Would result from $400\text{ m}^2 \times ₹15$, not the correct 480 m^2 .
 - **₹8,400 (C):** Implies $560\text{ m}^2 \times ₹15$ —too high.
 - **₹9,600 (D):** Corresponds to $640\text{ m}^2 \times ₹15$, far above actual bed area.

Question 116 Answer: B. ₹22,500

Explanation:

1. **Quadrant B area:** $100\text{ m} \times 75\text{ m} = 7,500\text{ m}^2$ (line 1).
2. **Meadow coverage:** $\frac{3}{4}$ of $7,500 = 5,625\text{ m}^2$ (line 3).
3. **Mowing rate:** ₹2 per m^2 per visit, bi-monthly = 2 visits/month (line 3).
4. **Total monthly cost:** $5,625\text{ m}^2 \times ₹2 \times 2 = ₹22,500$.
5. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **₹18,750 (A):** Uses only 1.67 visits or a wrong area multiplier.
 - **₹15,000 (C):** Assumes coverage of $3,750\text{ m}^2$, not $5,625\text{ m}^2$.
 - **₹30,000 (D):** Would be 2 visits on full quadrant ($7,500\text{ m}^2$), ignoring the $\frac{3}{4}$ factor.

Question 117 Answer: B. $3,000\text{ m}^2$

Explanation:

1. **Triangle base = 100 m, height = 60 m** (line 4).
2. **Area formula:** $\frac{1}{2} \times \text{base} \times \text{height} = \frac{1}{2} \times 100 \times 60 = 3,000\text{ m}^2$.
3. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **$2,500\text{ m}^2$ (A):** Implies height = 50 m or base = 50 m.
 - **$3,750\text{ m}^2$ (C):** Would be $\frac{3}{4}$ of rectangle $100 \times 60 = 4,500\text{ m}^2$.

- **4,000 m² (D):** Treats triangle as full rectangle 100×40 or similar miscalculation.

Question 118 Answer: B. ₹5,000

Explanation:

1. **Pond shoreline length:** Perimeter of 30 m × 20 m rectangle = $2 \times (30 + 20) = 100$ m (line 5).
2. **Monthly upkeep rate:** ₹50 per linear meter (line 5).
3. **Total cost:** 100 m × ₹50/m = ₹5,000.
4. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **₹2,500 (A):** Half the correct total, as if only one side treated.
 - **₹7,500 (C):** 1.5× the correct amount, no basis.
 - **₹10,000 (D):** Doubles the correct cost, misreading ₹100/m.

Question 119 Answer: A. ₹70,000

Explanation:

1. **Perimeter of entire lot:** $2 \times (200 + 150) = 700$ m (line 1).
2. **Fence height:** 2 m (line 6).
3. **Surface area (both faces):** Perimeter × height × 2 = $700 \times 2 \times 2 = 2,800$ m².
4. **Painting rate:** ₹25 per m² (line 6).
5. **Annual cost:** 2,800 m² × ₹25/m² = ₹70,000.
6. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **₹100,000 (B):** Would require 4,000 m² at ₹25.
 - **₹52,500 (C):** Uses only one face or wrong perimeter (2,100 m²).
 - **₹87,500 (D):** Implies 3,500 m² painted.

Question 120 Answer: A. 9 : 20

Explanation:

1. **Pond + path outer dimensions:** Pond 30×20, path adds 2 m each side → outer dims = 34 m × 24 m (line 5).
2. **Outer area:** $34 \times 24 = 816$ m².
3. **Pond area:** $30 \times 20 = 600$ m².
4. **Path area:** $816 - 600 = 216$ m².
5. **Vegetable-bed area:** 480 m² (from Q7).
6. **Ratio:** 216 : 480 = divide by 24 → 9 : 20.
7. **Why other options are incorrect:**
 - **1 : 2 (B):** Simplifies 216 : 432, not our numbers.
 - **3 : 7 (C):** No link to 216 : 504.
 - **2 : 5 (D):** Would be 200 : 500, unrelated.

Passage Explanation & Reading Approach The GreenLeaf passage details a 200 m × 150 m garden divided into four 100 m × 75 m quadrants: a vegetative patch with 12 raised beds, a three-quarter-area flower meadow, a triangular herb garden (base 100 m, height 60 m), and a 30 m × 20 m pond with a 2 m-wide path. Costs include monthly fertilizer per m², bi-monthly mowing per m², shoreline upkeep per linear meter, and annual fencing paint per m² (both faces). Test-takers must convert fractional coverage into areas, apply standard area formulas for rectangles and triangles, compute per-unit costs, and then combine or compare values. Organizing data by quadrant and formula - “Feature → Dimension → Area/Perimeter → Rate → Cost” —is key to managing multi-step calculations under time pressure.

Question-by-Question Approaches

Question 115 (Raised-Bed Fertilizer Cost):

Explanation: Compute total raised-bed area ($12 \times 8 \text{ m} \times 5 \text{ m} = 480 \text{ m}^2$) then multiply by ₹15/m². Simple multiplication after area calculation.

Question 116 (Meadow Mowing Cost):

Find meadow area ($\frac{3}{4}$ of $7,500 \text{ m}^2 = 5,625 \text{ m}^2$), then multiply by ₹2 per m² per visit × 2 visits. Combine fraction and repeated service cost.

Question 117 (Herb Garden Area):

Use triangle formula: $\frac{1}{2} \times \text{base} (100 \text{ m}) \times \text{height} (60 \text{ m})$. Direct application of geometry formula.

Question 118 (Pond Shoreline Cost):

Calculate pond perimeter ($2 \times (30 + 20) = 100 \text{ m}$) then multiply by ₹50 per linear meter monthly. Perimeter → linear cost.

Question 119 (Fence Painting Cost):

Compute total fence area: perimeter (700 m) × height (2 m) × 2 faces = $2,800 \text{ m}^2$, then × ₹25/m². Multi-face painting calculation.

Question 120 (Path-to-Bed-Area Ratio):

Determine path area: outer dims ($34 \times 24 = 816 \text{ m}^2$) minus pond (600 m^2) = 216 m^2 , then form ratio $216 : 480 \rightarrow 9 : 20$. Ratio of two computed areas.



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